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FACT FINDING BY THE WORLD COURT
NEILL H. ALFORD, JR.t
I.
INTRODUCTION.
T HE WORLD COURT is the principal judicial organ of the United
Nations Organization.' As a judicial organ, it is probably not in-
dispensable.2 What would happen to the United Nations Organization
without the Court is pure speculation. Quite possibly the General
Assembly would compensate for the loss by developing judicial func-
tions much as it has developed executive functions to offset the creep-
ing paralysis of the Security Council. Certainly the loss of the Court
would not mean the breakdown of all international machinery for the
peaceful settlement of differences. But an efficient World Court may
prove to be a major asset of the United Nations by performing three
important functions. The Court can give the Organization legal guid-
ance3 and can handle certain kinds of disputes between States.4  It
t Professor of Law, University of Virginia Law School. B.A. 1940. The Citadel;
LL.B. 1947, University of Virginia. Portions of this Article will be incorporated into
a thesis to be submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for an advanced degree
in law at the Yale Law School.
1. U.N. CHARTER art. 92. "World Court" is used henceforth to embrace the
Permanent Court of International Justice, which functioned from 1922 to 1940, and
the International Court of Justice, the present court which began its work in 1946.
The Permanent Court was not a part of the League. The International Court of
Justice is a part of the United Nations Organization although it has a separate
statute. See Hudson, The Succession of the International Court of Justice to the
Permanent Court of International Justice, 51 Am. J. INT'L L. 569 (1957).
2. Undiscriminating laymen, particularly those who have lost lawsuits, have
observed from time to time that the world might be much better off without lawyers.
3. The World Court, as of 1956, had given thirty-eight advisory opinions. All of
the requests to the Permanent Court of International Justice for advisory opinions
were made by the Council of the League. All of the requests to the International
Court of Justice, except one made by UNESCO, have been made by the General
Assembly. The General Assembly, the Security Council, and other organs of the
United Nations and specialized agencies authorized by the General Assembly to
make the requests, may request advisory opinions. U.N. CHARTER art. 96.
4. Prior to World War II, state disputes were sometimes presented to the Court
in the form of requests for advisory opinions. This practice is discussed in greater
detail subsequently in this Article. With some possible exceptions, such as the right
of the United Nations to protect its employees, only a State can be a party to con-
tentious proceedings before the Court. A respondent State cannot be brought before
the Court without its consent. Consent may be expressed in a special agreement
submitting the case to the Court, or it may be expressed in advance of the dispute
by acceptance of compulsory jurisdiction. The "optional clause" in the statute of the
Court provides a procedure whereby States may accept compulsory jurisdiction in
relation to other States accepting the same obligation in certain classes of disputes.
These disputes are those that are "legal" and which involve a question of treaty inter-
(37)
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can also create in the minds of the human members of the amorphous
international society in which it works a symbol of the United Nations
as a leadership institution - and this is what the United Nations
needs most of all.
Fact finding has an important relationship to these three major
services which the Court can offer. The legal guidance which the Court
gives or the judgment which it renders will be a useless abstraction
unless it is based upon actual events, formulated in the light of exist-
ing events, and designed to influence the shape of future events. The
tendency of national courts to decide cases which are in effect hypo-
thetical because of fact-finding lapses is dismally familiar to lawyers
and litigants. The World Court has obstacles to the finding of facts
which national courts do not encounter. The tendency of the Court
to decide hypothetical cases therefore is stronger. The more efficient
the fact finding processes of the World Court become, the better are
its opportunities to render useful decisions and give sound legal guid-
ance to the Organization.
The work of the Court as a creator of symbols and the relationship
to this work of fact finding are less obvious matters. There is now
a plateau in the growth of the United Nations from which we are un-
likely to move without a dramatic shift in human attitudes concerning
world government. The problem of the Organization is somewhat
analogous to that of a human being who must create in his own en-
vironment his rational fiction of what he believes himself to be. Once
the human being creates his fiction he feels obligated to measure up
pretation, of international law, or of the existence of any fact which if established
would constitute a breach of an international obligation, or of the nature or extent
of the reparation to be made for the breach of an international obligation. STAT.
INT'L CT. JUST. art. 36.
The members of the United Nations are ipso facto parties to the statute of the
Court, and only parties to the statute can accept compulsory jurisdiction. Thirty-three
acceptances of compulsory jurisdiction were in force in 1956, although most of these
are expressly subject to a condition of reciprocity and exclude special kinds of dis-
putes. The United States declaration, for example, excludes disputes essentially
within the domestic jurisdiction of the United States as determined by the United
States. 15 DEP'T STATE BULL. 452 (1946).
In addition to acceptances of compulsory jurisdiction, a great many treaties made
after the establishment of the Permanent Court and before World War n and many
treaties being made at the present time provide that disputes concerning interpreta-
tion shall be taken to the Court or that appeals may be taken to the Court from
decisions of arbitral tribunals which the treaties establish. The statute provides that
a reference in a treaty to the Permanent Court will be taken as a reference to the
International Court of Justice. STAT. INT'L CT. JUST. art. 37.
The Security Council may recommend that parties to a dispute of a legal charac-
ter submit the dispute to the Court for decision. U.N. CHARTER art. 36. Whether
States to which such a recommendation is made are obligated to take their dispute
before the Court is presently unsettled. See Corfu Channel case, Judgment of March
25, 1948, [1947-1948] I.C.J. Rep. 15, at 28. For some considerations relating to in-
herent limitations of the World Court in handling contentious litigation see LlSSITZYN,
THE INTERNATIONAL COURT O' JUSTICE 71 (1951).
[VOL. 4: p. 37
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to it. If he does not create his fiction for some reason, he has nothing
to live up to. Not only is there now lacking any consistent demand
from the people of the world that the United Nations be the focal point
where national and other differences can be settled peacefully, but the
permanent personnel of the Organization and the State officials con-
cerned with its affairs seem to lack a sense of obligation to act boldly
to stimulate such a demand. This is not to impugn the good intention
or deny the manifest ability of any statesman involved. The observa-
tion is intended only to illustrate the point that no dynamic symbol of
international government has been created in the minds of men or,
apparently, is in the making. A living organization is an image in
the minds of men, an image of what men think the organization should
be rather than a collection of constitutions, by-laws, organizational
routines, functonaries and filing cabinets.
Ignoring for immediate purposes the complex variables that are
involved in establishing a pattern of human conduct, three basic steps
are necessary to create a leadership symbol in the mind of a man. He
must be provoked to respond to a principle since a response to principle
is more intense and enduring than a response to other stimuli. He
must also be permitted to respond to inconsistent principles.5 A man
is prepared to give his primary loyalty to a leadership symbol if he
can reserve loyalty to secondary symbols. If loyalty to secondary sym-
bols is not permitted, loyalty to a primary leadership symbol is never
developed or, if developed, is greatly weakened. A man stoutly resists
slavery of his mind. It is in his mind that the defenses of self-respect
are erected. It has been aptly remarked that a loss of self-respect is
the first step to treason. But a third step is also necessary to create a
new leadership symbol. The mind must be helped to reconcile its re-
sponse to inconsistent principles. Some rational and acceptable ex-
planation must be forthcoming to justify response to a primary leader-
ship symbol while a response to other symbols is continued. New
leadership symbols are constructed in the human mind and old symbols
are diffused or subordinated in importance in this process of reconcil-
ing conflicting principles.
It is in the third basic step in developing leadership symbols that
the judicial system of an emerging political society usually figures so
prominently. In England, for example, the Common Law courts ham-
mered out the concept of a fictional and responsible Crown to which
paramount loyalty was due. The conflicting loyalties and confused
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mesh of rights and obligations that passed as Feudal and German law
were diffused and subordinated in importance to the fiction of the
Crown. Again, the Commerce Clause has been applied by the Supreme
Court of the United States to events produced by a growing industrial
society in such a way that the federal government has assumed the
direction of economic affairs while the role of state authority has been
correspondingly reduced. The task of the World Court is to create
an image of the United Nations in the minds of men as a primary
leadership symbol without eroding to any appreciable degree the re-
sponse of men to State and other parochial symbols.
The part played by courts in developing leadership symbols in
the early stages of formation of a political society differs radically from
their role when a political society has matured. When leadership
symbols have been developed and are firmly implanted, an insistence
upon loyalty to primary leadership symbols appears to produce minor
but frequent shifts in attitudes concerning subordinate symbols. In
this situation, the minds of men are more easily manipulated through
representative bodies with flexible procedures and in close contact with
the daily life of a community than the courts. In the United States
the disorderly growth of fraternal benefit societies and business cor-
porations after the Civil War required action by the Congress or by
the state legislatures. The courts could not deal with public utility
holding companies in the Twentieth Century until the Congress enacted
legislation for that purpose. The function of a court in a matured
political society tends to become of an interstitial and housekeeping
nature.' The court of an emerging political society must be a laborer
of all work.
Since peace was sought unsuccessfully in the League experiment,
it would not have been shocking to those who follow the work of
international organizations closely if the San Francisco Conference
had produced an international court system designed to spark a sound
and orderly growth of world government. It is the drive for resolu-
tion of conflict that provides the incentive for the formation of new
political societies. As a principal resolver of conflict, the adjudicator
has always been an obvious choice, for it is in its courts that an emerg-
ing government has its closest contact with the governed. But a court
in an inchoate political system must be more than the simple adjudi-
6. The term "interstitial" is used here in the sense that the Court functions as an
auxiliary to institutions which are charged with the continuous making, undoing and
remaking of policies that the management of a complex community requires. The
Court, of course, creates conditions under which policies are made by other institu-
tions, but it does this spasmodically without clear cut policing of the effects of its
decisions and consequent necessary adjustments.
[VOL. 4: p. 37
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cater that it may be in the matured political society. It must have the
power and the techniques to build a symbol of its own authority and
the authority of the government it represents. The World Court must
be able to direct its efforts into two channels. A leadership image must
be created in the minds of the officials responsible for the affairs of
the United Nations, and the necessary transfusion of ideas to the
Organization must be administered to keep the image alive.7 The
Court must also be able to aid in shaping and restricting the growth
of the leadership symbol which these officials may possibly succeed in
engrafting in the minds of the mass of men. We are not now concerned
with the role of the World Court in a matured political society. That
problem can be faced many generations hence by people better prepared
to deal with it.
The Court established at San Francisco in 1945 is primarily an
adjudicating institution in the "national" sense.8 The statute of the
Court is almost the same as that of the Permanent Court of Interna-
tional Justice with which it maintains, practically speaking, an un-
broken tradition and skein of experience. To the ordinary man, 9 the
man whose influence will determine ultimately whether there will be
effective international organization or not, the World Court is as re-
mote as the Supreme Court of Saturn. The statute of the Court can
be formally amended only in the manner provided for amendment of
the Charter of the United Nations.' ° Neither the statute nor the charter
are likely to be amended at any time in the foreseeable future. What
can be done to utilize the Court in such a way that its work will en-
hance the appeal of the United Nations to the "mass mind" as a leader-
ship symbol and thus increase the prestige and effective action of the
Organization at a time when effective action is sorely needed? How
can this be done without amending formally the statute of the Court?
The writer does not pretend to have pat answers to either of these
questions, and doubts that anyone does. The Court is in a good tactical
position for a move towards greater power. The Court is the final
7. Consider in this connection two of the advisory opinions rendered by the
World Court. In Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United
Nations, Advisory Opinion of April 11, 1949, [1949] I.C.J. Rep. 174, the Court held
that the United Nations had the status .to make an international claim to protect its
agents. In Effect of Awards of Compensation Made by the United Nations Adminis-
trative Tribunal, Advisory Opinion of July 13, 1954, [1954] I.C.J. Rep. 47, the Court
held that the United Nations had implied power to establish an administrative
tribunal to handle its internal administration.
8. See note 6 supra. It is a Court designed for interstitial operations in a society
which has no interstices. There is no continuous legislative or executive body in the
world community, the action of the single major executive body having been blocked
by the veto.
9. The "ordinary man" is everyone except the person who is talking about him.
10. STAT. INT'L CT. JUsT. art. 69.
FALL 1958]
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interpreter of its statute and makes its own rules." But the Court
will be powerless if it attempts to act alone. Only the States have
access to the Court in contentious proceedings and they must be pre-
pared to bring cases before it.' 2 The General Assembly and other inter-
national organizations which are authorized to seek advisory opinions'
3
must be prepared to seek the opinions and ask the proper questions.
The Court will lose its major basis of power if it forfeits its enviable
position of respect and loses its reputation for integrity. Those who
seek more for the Court and for the United Nations must tread lightly
and speak softly. 1
4
The single factor that perhaps will prove most rewarding if given
adequate attention is improvement of the fact-finding techniques of
the Court. Improvements in fact-finding techniques will arouse less
opposition than direct demands for compulsory jurisdiction or re-
lated extensions of the Court's statutory powers. Many such improve-
ments might be made without formal amendment of the statute. Im-
provements in fact-finding techniques will tend to bring the Court into
direct contact with the individual and thus within the attention frame
of the individual whose mind is an influence target. A major need
today is not access of individuals to the Court but access of the Court
to individuals.' 5 Historically, improvement of fact-finding techniques
has presaged an elaboration of court organization, an extension of jur-
isdiction and, ultimately, an increase in judicial influence. This de-
velopment may occur in the case of the World Court.
11. Id. arts. 36, 1 16; 60; 30, 1 1; 68.
12. Id. art. 34, 1.
13. U.N. CHARTER art. 96.
14. The concept that a court should be used for anything except the decision
of cases is a somewhat dangerous one. The hazards involved in turning courts to
political ends are well documented, e.g., United States v. Alstoetter, 3 Nurenberg
Military Tribunals, Trials of War Criminals, Case 3 at 31 (1947) ; VYssIINSKY, THE
LAW op THE SovIET STATE 497-98 (1951). A number of the able jurists associated
with the Permanent Court or the International Court of Justice have argued for
moderation in seeking an extension of the Court's authority or more reasonable
expectations concerning the type of work the Court is to do. E.G., DeVisscher,
Reflections on the Present Prospects of International Adjudication, 50 AM. J. INT'L
L. 467 (1956). Judge Krylov in his dissenting opinion in Admission of a State to the
United Nations (Charter, Art. 4), Advisory Opinion of May 28, 1948, [1947-1948]
I.C.J. Rep. 57, quotes Judge Hudson, a former Judge of the Permanent Court, upon
the point that the activity of the Court should not be "artificially stimulated."
15. In certain rare instances individuals have had an opportunity to get their
cases before the Court. In Danzig Legislative Decrees, P.C.I.J., Ser. A/B, No. 65
(advisory opinion 1935), the Court considered a dispute concerning a statute enacted
by the Danzig Senate applying the criminal law doctrine of analogy. The Court deter-
mined that the Free City of Danzig should have State status for this proceeding.
This meant, in effect, that the Court would hear only one side of the case since the
Senate represented the Free City and the Senate was Nazi-controlled. The President
of the Court therefore received an explanatory note from the opposing political parties
in Danzig, although these parties were not allowed to be representd in the oral
proceedings.
[VOL. 4: p. 37
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What are the fact-finding techniques of the World Court and how
well do they work? Although it is somewhat misleading to treat gen-
erally the functions of any institution, it may be helpful to view fact
gathering by the World Court from the perspective used to examine
fruitfully national intelligence systems.
Fact gathering is an endless process. Some facts must be avail-
able to the fact-finder in the beginning to enable him to appraise his
fact-finding task. Who are the fact finders of the World Court? Why
are they looking for facts? What facts are they looking for? How
is a flow of basic information necessary for the appraisal process main-
tained to the Court and the people who appear before it? What legal
doctrines condition their access to this information and their use of it ?"6
How are fact-finding missions allocated once the intelligence task
is appraised? Whose decisions determine the allocation? To what
extent does the allocation of the fact-finding task condition the facts
available to the Court for decision?
Once the fact-finding task is determined and missions allocated,
how is the actual surveillance executed? What legal doctrines deter-
mine the facts that will get before the Court and those that will not?
Whose decisions determine what facts will be considered and what
facts ignored?
These are some of the questions that ought to be asked about the
fact-finding functions of the World Court. This Article does not pur-
port to answer all of them. The conclusions which international courts
are prepared to draw from facts embrace most of the traditional doctrine
of international law. This article considers primarily the fact gather-
ing functions and suggests some tentative thoughts concerning their
improvement.
II.
THE FACT FINDERS AND THEIR APPRAISAL OF THE
INTELLIGENCE TASK.
The World Court has fifteen judges elected for nine year terms
by the General Assembly and Security Council of the United Nations.17
The first elections were for staggered terms so that the terms of one-
third of the judges now expire at three year intervals. In the decade
between 1946 and 1956 the membership of the Court has been fairly
constant. Three members of the Court died."8 Judge Golunsky resigned
16. It must be observed in this connection that part of the "background" informa-
tion of the fact finder will be facts derived from the appraisal of the results of earlier
surveillance tasks.
17. STAT. INT''L CT. JusT. arts. 3, 4.
18. Judges Azevado, Benegal Rau and Hsu Mo.
FALL 1958]
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before the expiration of his term. All of the judges elected originally
for three year terms were reelected in 1948.'9 In the elections of
1951 and 1954 two of the five judges subject to election were re-
elected.2" A quorum of nine judges suffices to constitute the Court.21
The average age of the judges at the time of their election has
been between 60 and 61. The eldest at the time of his election was
Judge Alvarez, who was 78; and the youngest, Judge Kojevnikov, who
was 50. The geographical distribution of judges has been fairly even.
L.atin America has enjoyed a slight preponderance, having from three
to four seats during the decade.2 2 The Far East has been under repre-
sented.2 ' No State can have two of its nationals on the Court.2 4 The
Permanent Members of the Security Council have had judges on the
Court throughout the decade. All of the judges elected have had
distinguished legal backgrounds, about half of the Court having had
some international or national judicial experience at the time of their
elections.25
The statute of the Court provides for appointment of an ad hoc
judge at the option of a State which is before the Court but has no
national among its membership. 26  This may be done in contentious
proceedings and in some advisory proceedings when the outcome of
the advisory proceeding may directly affect the interest of a State
which has appeared to offer information. 7 Ad hoc judges have been
named in eight of the twenty-one contentious cases submitted to the
Court between 1946 and 1956.28 The ad hoc judge may serve as an
analgesic to the tender feelings of a State which has no judge. In con-
tentious proceedings in which one State party has a national on the
Court, the appointment of an ad hoc judge may offset his vote.2 9 A
19. Judges Winiarski, Zorocic, Badawi, Read, Hsu Mo.
20. In 1951, Judges Hackworth and Klaestad; in 1954, Judges Guerrero and
Basdevant.
21. STAT. INT'L CT. JUST. art. 25, fr 3.
22. In 1956 there were four Latin American Judges, Guerrero, Armand-Ugon,
Quintana and Cordova.
23. Judge Hsu Mo was elected in 1946. Sir Benegal Rau was elected in 1951 and
Sir Muhammad Zafrulla Khan succeeded him in 1954.
24. STAT. INT'L CT. JUST. art. 3, 1.
25. Biographical sketches of the judges may be found in the Yearbooks of the
Court.
26. STAT. INT'L CT. JUST. art. 31.
27. The provision for ad hoc judges in advisory proceedings is made in RuLEs
INT'L CT. JUST. art. 83.
28. Three of the cases grew out of the Haya de la Torre dispute between Columbia
and Peru and the same ad hoc judges were named in each. The other cases were the
Corfu Channel case, the Ambatielos case, the Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. case, the Case of
Monetary Gold Received fron Rome in 1943 and the Nottebohm case.
29. This assumes, of course, that the national judge will usually vote in favor
of the claim his State asserts. This is not invariably the case. Thus Judge McNair
voted in favor of Iran on the preliminary objection to jurisdiction in the Anglo-
Iranian Oil Co. case, Judgment of July 22, 1952, [1952] I.C.J. Rep. 93.
[VOL. 4: p. 37
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judge is not disqualified simply because he is a national of one of the
parties."0 The ad hoc judge may also bring to the Court a knowledge
of local conditions affecting one of the parties which the Court would
otherwise lack. This might be true if the ad hoc judge is a resident
of the State which appoints him or is especially familiar with its law
and political traditions.8'
The rules of the Court provide for the appointment of technical
assessors to sit with the Court in particular cases without vote. 2 The
assessors are appointed by the Court by majority vote. A provision
was also made for assessors in the statute of the Permanent Court"
but assessors have not yet been used in any case.
The statute permits the Court to form Chambers composed of
three or more judges to deal with particular cases or with particular
types of cases requiring specialized knowledge, such as labor or transit
cases.14  Chambers were constituted by the Permanent Court but
never used. Chambers have not been constituted by the International
Court of Justice. The statute requires the Court to form annually a
Summary Chamber composed of five judges for the speedy dispatch
of business at the request of the parties. The Mosul Case35 was de-
cided by the Court sitting as a Chamber of Summary Procedure but
otherwise, although the Chamber is constituted annually as the statute
requires, it has not been used in regular proceedings. 31
Parties before the Court must be represented by agents and are
entitled to the assistance of counsel and advocates.37  There are no
rules restricting the right of pleading before the Court and any person
appointed by a State to represent it may be admitted."8 The agent is
the channel of communication between the State he represents and
the Court. Obviously, parties who appear before the Court take care
to be represented by agents and counsel of outstanding ability.89
30. STAT. INT'L CT. JusT. art. 31, 1.
31. In the Corfu Channel Case, Judgment of April 9, 1949, [19491 I.C.J. Rep. 4,judge Ecer, the Albanian ad hoc judge, was a Czech national, and while a judge of
demonstrated ability probably had little knowledge of Albanian local conditions.
32. RULPS INT'L CT. JusT. art. 7.
33. Id. arts. 26, 27.
34. Id. art. 26.
35. P.C.I.J., Ser. B, No. 12 (1925). STAT. INT'L Cr. JusT. art. 29 requires forma-
tion of the Summary Chamber.
36. See note 15 supra for a hearing of private parties by the Summary Chamber.
37. STAT. INT'L CT. JUST. art. 42.
38. P.C.I.J., Ser. E, No. 1, at 265; P.C.I.J. Ser. E, No. 3, at 204.
39. A degree of difficulty has been experienced by the Court because of the use
of agents who do not take up residence at the Hague. In the case of the Electricity
Company of Sofia and Bulgaria, P.C.I.J. Ser. E, No. 16, at 149, the Bulgarian agent
was unable to collaborate with his French counsel because of circumstances of force
majeure and failed to file his rejoinder. The Court took the position that the agent
should select some counsel whose collaboration could be effectively secured and that
FALL 1958]
9
Alford: Fact Finding by the World Court
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1958
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
The Registrar is the chief administrative officer of the Court
and handles all communications to and from it.4 The Registrar is
a combination Clerk of Court, Court Reporter and administrative
manager.41 The Registrar is elected for a term of seven years by the
Court and may be reelected.42 The Registrars have performed their
duties efficiently.
The personnel who are to find facts upon which the decisions of
the World-Court are to be based seem to be prepared in training and
experience at least as well as, if not better than, appointees to equiva-
lent positions in national courts. The average age of the Court is low
considering the experience of the judges and the dignity of their posi-
tion. The eldest member of the Court at the time of his appointment,
Judge Alvarez, who retired in 1955, is noted for the forthrightness
of his opinions and his acute perception of the real task which the
Court faces. The Court does appear to need additional judges, par-
ticularly from the Far East and Africa to provide not only legal skills
but a knowledge of the customs and demands of the peoples they
represent.4" The Institute of International Law has recommended re-
cently that if there must be an increase in the number of judges, the
increase should not exceed a total of 18." The writer is convinced
that elections to the Court should be for life, that an optional retire-
ment age should be set at 70, and that a judge of the Court should
the Bulgarian Government could not, of its own volition, prevent continuation of the
proceedings instituted by Belgium. The Court was convoked for February 15th, 1940,
to hear the case on the merits but did not meet because of the German invasion of
the Netherlands. STAT. INT'L CT. JusT. art. 42, 3 provides that agents, counsel and
advocates shall enjoy the privileges and immunities necessary to the independent
exercise of their functions. In 1946 the General Assembly recommended that agents,
counsel and advocates should be accorded, during the period of their missions, in-
cluding the time spent on journeys in connection with their missions, the privileges
and immunities provided in Art. IV, §§ 11-13 of the Convention on Privileges and
Immunities of the United Nations. See P.I.C.J., Ser. D, No. 1, at 85. For the text
of the Convention see HILL, INTERNATIONAL OFFICIALS, IMMUNITIES AND PRIVILECES
224 (1947).
40. RULES INT'L CT. JUST. arts. 18-23.
41. The Registrar prepares the instructions for the Registry which are approved
by the President subject to subsequent approval by the Court. RULtS INT'L CT. JUST.
art. 18. A comprehensive discussion of the work of the Registry, including the Staff
Regulations and Instructions, appears in I.C.J. 'YEARBOOK (1946-47) at 57.
42. STAT. INT'L CT. JusT. art. 21, ff 2; RuLEs INT'L CT. JUST. art. 14.
43. As additional States become parties to the statute there will be increased
pressure for additional judges. In connection with the Columbian-Peruvian Asylumn
case, Judgment of November 20, 1950, [1950] I.C.J. Rep. 266, Columbian officials
observed that the decision was made mainly by European judges unfamiliar with Latin
American conditions. See LIsSITZYN, THE INTERNATIONAL COURT oF JUSTICE 84
(1951).
44. See Hudson, The Thirty-Third Year of the World Court, 49 AM. J. INT'L L. 1,
14 (1955).
[VOL. 4: p. 37
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be entitled to full pay upon retirement.4 5 If the Court is expected to
exert a positive influence in international affairs, the judges must be
guaranteed a degree of independence in their positions which they do
not now possess.
This is not to say that a judge should be expected to sever his
ties with his State. The efficiency of the judge as a fact-finder depends
in part upon the ties that he is able to maintain. It is important that
the judges should feel free to press their inquires and make their
decisions without the threat of informal retaliation through economic
or political pressures when their service upon the bench is completed.
The writer is also convinced of the value of the ad hoc judge, who in
some cases may be unduly persuasive,46 but who nevertheless may
bring new facts before the Court about the State which appoints him.
Some precaution is probably necessary to insure that the ad hoc judge
will be qualified professionally.4 7 Perhaps, as a qualification, he should
have professional legal experience for a stipulated period in the terri-
tory of the State which names him.4"
It should be observed, however, that substantial changes in the
status of Court personnel cannot be made without changes in the
statute. The General Assembly determines the salary of the judges
and the Registrar and by its regulations can fix the conditions under
which retirement pensions may be given.49  But there is no way in
which it can increase the term of office. The provisions for the appoint-
ment of ad hoc judges in contentious proceedings are inflexible, al-
though the Court might set special conditions for them when used in
advisory cases. 0
A judge of the World Court has access to the Carnegie Library
in the Peace Palace at the Hague and, of course, to the services of
the library of the Court. 'He also has access to the newspaper clip-
45. The Institute of International Law recommends that the judges be elected
for fifteen years and not be eligible for reelection. The Institute suggests a compulsory
retirement age of 75 in the event an age limit is established. Hudson, op. cit. supra
at 14.
46. See HUDSON, THE PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAI, JusTICE (1920-
1942) 360 (1943).
47. The Institute of International Law recommends that "if the system of ad
hoc judges cannot be abandoned" the appointment of such judges should be subject
to guarantees to secure ad hoc judges with qualifications, that measure up to those
of titular judges. The Institute is concerned primarily with the qualifications of the
officials who appoint the ad hoc judges. See Hudson, The Thirty-Third Year of the
World Court, 49 AM. INT'L L. 1, 14-15 (1955).
48. See HUDSON, THE PERMANENT COURT Ol INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE (1920-
1942) 366-69 (1943).
49. STAT. INT'L CT. JUST, art. 32. For the pension plan for the Court see P.I.C.J.,
Ser. D, No. 1, at 91.
50. The use of ad hoc judges in advisory cases is within the discretion of the
Court. STAT. INT'L, CT. JUST. art. 68.
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ping service performed by the Archivist of the Registry.5 In the
normal course of events he is also called upon to serve on committees
of international organizations formed for the study of problems related
to his specialty or on arbitral commissions and in related judicial or
quasi-judicial positions. A judge of the World Court, unlike the judges
of many national courts, cannot retire into a cloister to emerge only
for the hearing of cases and the reading of decisions.
The special environment in which a judge of the World Court
must live and work has produced two problems, both of which are
related to his effectiveness as a fact finder. What positions can he
accept without compromising his position as a judge? Under what
circumstances in relation to a particular case is he obliged to step
aside because he knows too much about it?
The statute of the Court is not particularly helpful in answering
either question. Article 17 of the statute sets forth certain grounds of
disqualification that seem obvious as well as reasonable. No member
of the Court may participate in the decision of any case in which he
has previously taken part as agent, counsel or advocate for one of the
parties, or as a member of a national or international court, or of a
commission of inquiry, or in any other capacity. 2 Any doubt on the
point is settled by a decision of the Court. A judge is not disqualified
simply because he is a national of a State which is a party before the
Court.5" Suppose he is extremely well informed about a case before
it reaches the Court. Is he obligated to disqualify himself on this
ground only? Is he obligated to disqualify himself if he has reached
a tentative opinion as to the proper result? This seems to be a matter
primarily for the judge's conscience. He is to inform the President
of the Court if he feels that he should not take part in the decision
of a case.54 The President may raise the issue, and if the President
and the member of the Court disagree, the matter is to be settled by
a decision of the Court.55 There is no provision for challenge of a
judge by the agent of a party.
If emphasis is to be placed upon increasing the efficiency of the
fact finding functions of the Court, a substantial change should be
made in the result of disqualification of a judge. While it is important
to preserve the integrity of the Court and to preserve the fiction that
the decision maker receives the case without preconceived opinion as
51. I.C.J. YEARBOOK (1946-47) 81.
52. STAT. INT'L CT. JusT. art. 17, T 2.
53. Id. art. 31, IT 1.
54. Id. art. 24, U 1.
55. Id. art. 24, II 3.
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to the proper outcome, the same standards should not be applied to a
judge of the World Court that are applied to a judge of a national
court. Many cases that come before national courts are veiled by a
mantle of anonymity because they lack news interest and because
the docket of the court is so crowded that the judge would not have
time to concern himself with the facts even if he were so inclined.
The case that comes before the World Court has probably been the
plaything of the press for months before formal hearings. Certain
cases, such as the Corfu Channel Case5" and the Anglo-Iranian Oil Co.
Case57 are argued in the press by State propagandists before their
counsel appear in Court.
While a disqualification rule should be retained, the disqualifica-
tion should go only to the vote in the decision and should not prevent
a judge from participating in the oral proceedings, questioning counsel
and consulting with his colleagues while they consider the case. Thus,
in the Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. Case Sir Benegal Rau disqualified him-
self because he had represented his State on the Security Council when
the Council considered the United Kingdom complaint concerning
Iranian failure to carry out interim measures of protection indicated
by the Court. 8 In the Nottebohm Case5" a judge had advised one of
the parties prior to his election to the Court and was disqualified.
He did not participate in the adjudication of the case. In both in-
stances it would seem that the judge concerned should have been per-
mitted to participate in the proceedings without a vote so that he
could contribute such special information to the Court as he possessed."0
The principle should apply with special force in advisory proceedings
in which the decision of the Court is usually not binding in a legal
sense. It should be possible to develop a principle of "qualified" dis-
qualification, such as that suggested, by a narrow construction of
the statute, limiting the word "decision" simply to the vote upon which
the actual decision in the case is taken.
The statute states that a judge may not act as agent, counsel
or advocate in any case6 and that he may not exercise any political
or administrative function or engage in any other occupation of a
professional nature.62 While it is especially important that the col-
56. Judgment of April 9, 1949 [1949] I.C.J. Rep. 4.
57. Judgment of July 22, 1952 [1952] I.C.J. Rep. 93.
58. I.C.J. YEARBOOK (1953-54) 96.
59. I.C.J. YEARBOOK (1954-55) 88.
60. Such disclosure should, of course, be subject to the professional obligation due
a client.
61. STAT. INT'L CT. JUST. art. 17, f 1.
62. Id. art. 16, 1.
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lateral activities of a judge not detract from the reputation of the
Court for integrity and fairness, it is equally important that the judge
not be removed from the sources of information that international
committees and other projects of an international character may pro-
vide. The present practice of the Court appears to be liberal except
with respect to service upon arbitral tribunals or commissions. There
is, for example, no incompatibility between the function of judge and
acting as chairman of an ad hoc committee set up by the General
Assembly with a view to finding a humanitarian solution to the prob-
lem of prisoners of war."8 On the other hand, any function which
compels a judge to follow the instructions of his government, regard-
less of his personal views, is political. This includes the position of
delegate for a government to the International Labor Conference. 64
The principle applied by the Permanent Court to determine the in-
compatibility of the function of judge and service on an arbitral tri-
bunal was, originally, whether the agreement upon which the arbi-
tration was based provided for an appeal to the Court or settlement
by the Court in case the arbitration failed. 5 At a later date this
principle was abandoned upon the assumption that the judge could
be disqualified if the case ultimately came before the Court.66
The International Court of Justice has applied a principle more
restrictive than that established originally by the Permanent Court.
A judge may not accept the functions of arbitrator, chairman of a
commission of conciliation or inquiry, or any similar function, if there
is any provision to the effect that a decision taken by him, or one
in which he has taken part, may be the subject of an application to
the Court or if there is a possibility that the decision may be the sub-
ject of an application.6"
The judges of the World Court should be encouraged to par-
ticipate actively in international affairs collateral to their duties upon
the Court. In this activity the judge may develop "background" in-
formation that will enhance his ability to find facts while performing
his judicial duties. Subject to the rule for disqualification mentioned
in this Article, the judge may likewise contribute to the Court in-
formation derived from his participation in arbitral and conciliation
proceedings. 68
63. I.C.J. YEARBOOK (1953-54) 96.
64. P.C.I.J., Ser. E, No. 7, at 278.
65. P.C.I.J., Ser. E, No. 3, at 178; P.C.I.J., Ser. E, No. 13, at 145.
66. P.C.I.J., Ser. E, No. 7, at 277.
67. I.C.J. YEARBOOK (1953-54) 96.
68. The members of the Court enjoy diplomatic immunities but only when en-
gaged on the business of the Court. STAT. INT'L CT. JUST. art. 19. The judges of
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The fact-finding potentialities of the use of the President's appoint-
ing power do not appear from the record to have been realized. Treaties
sometimes provide for appointment by the President of the Court of
arbitrators, umpires or members of conciliation commissions. Thus,
the Treaty of Lausanne provided for appointment of the President of
the Mixed Arbitral Tribunals by the President of the Court if the
parties could not agree upon a selection. The President performed
this function in 1924 by appointing a President for the Greco-Turkish
and Romano-Turkish Tribunals. 9 Special requests are sometimes made
by States or international organizations for appointments to fill special
offices. In 1954 the President nominated a Chairman for a Special
Advisory Board appointed by the Secretary-General of the United
Nations.7" Requests are also made by corporations to appoint arbi-
trators to settle contract disputes and these requests are usually granted.
Certain appointments, quite certainly, have no potential value to
the Court as information sources.7 But in other instances, such as an
appointment of members of a conciliation commission or arbitral board,
the appointment could be conditioned upon reports by the member
concerned or upon his willingness to testify or produce evidence be-
fore the Court if later called upon. The President is usually approached
and his consent secured before the treaty provision or special request
for appointment is made. The appointing practice does seem to be a
bud from which increased efficiency in finding facts could quickly flower.
III.
ALLOCATION OF THE INTELLIGENCE TASK.
Judge Hudson, in his careful and distinguished treatment of the
work of the Permanent Court of International Justice, states: "Issues
of fact are seldom tried before the Court, and where a question ot
fact arises the Court must usually base its finding on statements made
on behalf of the parties either in the documents of the written pro-
the Court have general diplomatic immunity in the Netherlands. This immunity would
not exist in the State of which the judge was a national. There is thus a practical
limitation upon the suggestions of the writer concerning disclosures of information
obtained in collateral activities of the judges since a judge might breach the security
regulations of his State by reason of his disclosure. As suggested in note 60 supra,
the disclosures should also be subject to the judge's obligation of professional
confidence.
69. P.C.I.J., Ser. E, No. 1, at 150.
70. I.C.J. YEARBOOK (1953-54) 44.
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ceedings or in the course of oral proceedings".72 His remark applies
with equal accuracy to the work of the International Court of Justice.
The exclusion of fact in the Anglo-American judicial duel has
come to be taken for granted by American judges and lawyers. The
burden is on the opponent to produce the facts and, if he can be kept
from getting them in, so much the better for the client. The practice
has been tolerated not only because of the lawyer's affection for tradi-
tion but because the judge does not have the time to set out upon ex-
tensive fact-finding inquiries of his own. The judge is an umpire at
trial. The judge on appeal tends to accept the facts produced at trial.
There is no reason why this situation should exist in cases brought
before the World Court. The General List of the Court is not over-
crowded and the judges, or at least most of them, are not imbued with
Anglo-American legal traditions. Why are the parties allowed to per-
form the major fact-finding function before the World Court? Who
makes the decisions which determine who finds the facts?
The statute of the Court sets forth the major outlines of the
fact-finding missions which the Court can pursue. Since the statute
is based upon State consent and State consent pervades the entire
problem of the Court's jurisdiction, it is understandable that special
deference should be shown to the statements made by State repre-
sentatives and the facts produced by them. Nevertheless, in spite of
the very real obstacle that State consent presents in fact-finding, this
single factor cannot explain why the Court has not moved with greater
freedom in finding facts within the confines that its statute establishes.
Two factors appear to account for the reticence of the Court,
particularly in contentious cases, to make independent inquiries. The
Court has been prone to regard executive-administrative findings-of-
fact as conclusive because of the limitations set by the statute upon
its own fact-finding activities. This predisposition has carried over
into contentious litigation, the State being treated as an administrative
fact-finder whose conclusions must be accepted at face value unless
manifestly questionable. Likewise, in the history of the Permanent
Court, there were efforts to use the Court as a fact-finding institution
for the League and other international organizations. This resulted in
resistence within the Court to any extension of judicial fact-finding
activity.
72. HUDSON, THE PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE (1920-1942)
565 (1943).
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A. The Notion of Executive-Administrative Finality.
In the Anglo-American and Civil Law judicial systems the theory
of finality of administrative and legislative findings-of-fact has been
firmly implanted. The theory may be based upon constitutional sepa-
ration of powers, upon a need for efficiency in sifting voluminous facts
or upon the inability of the Court to appraise remote events. It is
understandable that judges trained in the Anglo-American and Civil
Law systems should tend to apply these theories to the work of the
World Court. There is also more justification for the application of
theories of finality when the fact-finding ability of the Court is sub-
stantially curtailed. The Court has no processes to compel the pro-
duction of evidence. It may request of public international organiza-
tions information relative to cases before it,73 and may call upon the
agents to produce any document or supply any explanation. 74 Relevant
questions may be put to witnesses and experts.73 But the Court must
depend upon the consent of States to produce witnesses or permit the
making of inquiries on the spot.76 Requests for advisory opinions
must be accompanied by all documents "likely to throw light" upon
the question. 7
7
Lacking the necessary power to compel the production of the
evidence it may need, the Court tends to rely heavily upofi the evidence
submitted without positive efforts to police the truth of the facts. In
the case of The Prince of Pless,78 Poland maintained that the German
application was inadmissible so long as the Prince had failed to exhaust
his administrative remedies in Poland. The Court found it unnecessary
to pass upon the issue of exhaustion of remedies: "Since in any event
it will certainly be an advantage to the Court, as regards the points
which have to be established in the case, to be acquainted with the final
decision of the Supreme Polish Administrative Tribunal upon the
appeals brought by the Prince von Pless and now pending before that
tribunal and .. . the Court must therefore arrange its procedure so
as to insure that this will be possible. '" 79
In the case of Jurisdiction of the European Commission of the
Danube80 a special committee of inquiry appointed by the Technical
Committee for Communications and Transit of the League had con-
73. STAT. INT'L CT. JusT. art. 34, ff 2.
74. Id. art. 49.
75. Id. art. 51.
76. Id. art. 44.
77. Id. art. 65, 1 2.
78. P.C.I.J., Ser. A/B, No. 52 (Order of Feb. 4, 1933).
79. Prince of Pless, supra note 78 at 16.
80. P.C.I.J., Ser. B, No. 14 (1927).
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ducted an investigation of the case on the spot and had examined
witnesses and records. The Romanian agent contested the findings
of the special committee. The Court stated: "The facts having been
already investigated by the Special Committee appointed by the League
of Nations, and its report having been adopted by the competent body
of the League, the Court does not think it proper to make new investi-
gations and inquiries.""1
Apparently the showing of an erroneous finding must be clear
before the Court will initiate its own inquiry. In the case of The
Monastery of St. Naou s2 the Conference of Ambassadors, upon rec-
ommendation by its delimitation commission, had set a boundary be-
tween Albania and Yugoslavia. The Yugoslav agent objected that
the finding was based upon erroneous information or adopted without
regard to certain essential facts. The Court was prepared to consider
whether new facts had been produced or old facts overlooked. The
Conference of Ambassadors had informed the Court that it had not
been acquainted with the documents offered by the Yugoslavs to sup-
port their claim for revision until after its decision had been made.
The Court stated its opinion, however, that "new documents do not in
themselves amount to fresh facts".8" The Yugoslavs also contended
that the Conference had overlooked certain proposals made to the Con-
ference of Ambassadors in 1913. The Court stated:
"It is however difficult to believe that the members of the
Conference of Ambassadors were unacquainted with these docu-
ments, which are in no sense secret. The application of the London.
Protocol to determine the Serbo-Albanian frontier was proposed
by the Conference of Ambassadors itself, and the Conference
obviously did so with full knowledge of the facts, that is to say,
after acquainting itself with the documents relating to the London
Conference of 1913. ' ' s4
B. Pressures to Make the Court an Administrative Fact-Finder.
It was perhaps natural that the Council of the League, the execu-
tive body of that Organization charged with peace enforcement func-
tions, should attempt to use the facilities of the Court as an aid in
81. Jurisdiction of European Commission of the Danube, supra note 80 at 46.
82. P.C.I.J., Ser. B, No. 9 (1924).
83. The Monastery of St. Naoum, supra note 82 at 22.
84. Ibid. After the decision of the Court, the Yugoslav Minister at Paris sent
to the President of the Conference of Ambassadors a letter circulated by Count
Berchtold in 1913 to certain ambassadors of Austria-Hungary. This letter convinced
the Conference that it has been mistaken in its judgment which the Court had sus-
tained. Based upon this letter, the Albanian and Yugoslav settled the boundary dis-
pute by negotiation and the settlement was accepted by the Conference. P.C.I.J.,
Ser. E, No. 2, at 137.
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accomplishing its mission. The details of the use by the Council of
advisory opinions as a device for presenting contentious litigation to
the Court are considered hereafter. But once the entering wedge was
placed, the Council also sought advisory opinions relating to the diffi-
cuties of the Free City of Danzig. The Free City was a ward of the
Council and was under the general supervision of a High Commis-
sioner. In a series of cases, the first group involving Polish claims
to certain functions within the City and access to port facilities and
the second rising out of Nazi party activity within the City, the Council
threw administrative problems into the lap of the Court that probably
could and should have been solved by the Council and High Commis-
sioner without judicial action. 5 There was also a tendency to try to
thrust upon the Court some of the fact-finding problems of the Mixed
Commission for the exchange of Greek and Turkish populations under
the Convention of Lausanne. The Court dutifully complied with the
requests for aid in the Danzig cases, although in Danzig Legislative
Decrees, Judge Anzilotti remarked:
"All that can be said is that the reason why the Council asked
for the Court's opinion was because it desired to be informed as
to the scope and effects of certain provisions of the Danzig Con-
stitution and of certain acts of the Senate, in order to enable it
to exercise the guarantees of the League of Nations. Now al-
though it is the right and obligation of the Council to obtain any
information which it considers useful or necessary, it is equally
true that it must do this by appropriate methods, and must not
seek to impose on the Court duties different from those for which
it was created and organized."8 6
With respect to inquiries by the Mixed Commission, however, the
Court assumed a different attitude. In Exchange of Greek and Turkish
Populations7 the Mixed Commission induced the Council of the League
to seek the opinion of the Court on the questions:
"What meaning and scope should be attributed to the word
'established' in Article 2 of the Treaty of Lausanne . . . in regard
to which discussions have arisen and arguments have been put
forward which are contained in the documents communicated
by the Mixed Commission? And what conditions must the per-
sons who are described in Article 2 . . . under the name of 'Greek
85. The Polish Postal Services at Danzig, P.C.I.J., Ser. B, No. 11 (1925)
Jurisdiction of the Courts of Danzig, P.C.I.J., Ser. B, No. 15 (1928); Anchorage
in the Port of Danzig of Polish War Vessels, P.C.I.J., Ser. B, No. 43 (1931) ; Treat-
ment of Polish Nationals in Danzig, P.C.I.J., Ser. A/B, No. 44 (1932) ; Danzig
Legislative Decrees, P.C.I.J., Ser. A/B, No. 65 (1935).
86. Danzig Legislative Decrees, P.C.I.J., Ser. A/B, No. 65, at 61 (1935).
87. P.C.I.J., Ser. B, No. 10 (1925).
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inhabitants of Constantinople' fulfill in order that they may be
considered as 'established' under the terms of the Convention
and exempt from compulsory exchange." 88
The Court answered the first question but as to the second carefully
qualified its answer. The Court was
"* . neither called upon to prepare in advance solutions for all
of the problems that may arise with regard to the application of
Article 2 . . . and is not in possession of sufficient information
to do so. . . . In the absence of sufficient materials in the dis-
cussions and arguments submitted to it, it must abstain from pro-
viding concrete solutions for the complex problems which may
arise in the application of Article 2 to persons who, though be-
longing to one family, do not individually satisfy the conditions
laid down in that article. The power conferred upon the Mixed
Commission by Article 12 enables that body, within the limits
fixed by the clauses of the Convention, to find an equitable solu-
tion for any disputed points."8"
The preparedness of the Court to accept administrative findings
of fact, reinforced to a degree by an adverse reaction of the Court to
efforts to press it into the role of administrative fact-finder in the
years preceding World War II, has caused the Court to slip into a
position in which it is loath to take advantage of the limited avenues
of independent inquiry which its statute permits.
The ready acceptance by the Court of conclusions of fact by State
parties has two manifest disadvantages. The adequacy and honesty
of State fact-finding processes are presumed in a period in which the
conscious use of techniques for distorting facts is an accepted and
anticipated practice in the execution of State policies."0 Also the tedious
processes of State administrative action delay in many cases the pres-
entation of facts to the Court until long after the events which give
rise to the controversy. Thus, in the case of Serbian Loans Issued in
France9 the French bondholders spent six years trying to interest the
88. The Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations, supra note 87 at 7.
89. The Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations, supra note 87 at 23. In
the Ambatielos Case, Judgment of May 19, 1953, [1953] I.C.J. Rep. 10, 16 the Court
refused to pass judgment upon any question of law or fact falling within "the merits
of the difference" or "the validity of the claim" since that would encroach upon thejurisdiction of the arbitral commission.
90. Consider in this connection the British allegation in the Corfu Channel Case
that Albania had secured the Hodgson Report by espionage and had edited the report
before photographing it for evidence. 2 CORFU CHANNEL CASE - PLEADINGS, ORAL
ARGUMENTS, AND DOCUMENTS 255-56 (I.C.J. 1948). For a comment upon apparent
Yugoslav lack of frankness in the same case see the dissenting opinion of Judge
Azevedo. Corfu Channel Case, Judgment of April 9, 1949 [1949] I.C.J. Rep. 4, at 89.
91. P.C.I.J., Ser. A, No. 20 (1929). The proceedings of the Court tend to
produce decisions more rapidly than those of arbitral tribunals. Also there is usually
less delay in submitting cases to the Court than to arbitration.
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French Government in their case. The case was submitted to the
Court three years after France decided that the bondholders should
be protected. The judgment of the Court was rendered one year later.
In the meantime there had been speculation in the Serbian bonds and
the original subscribers had taken their losses long before the decision
of the Court. The Court could not concern itself with this matter.
92
C. Allocation of the Intelligence Task in Contentious Cases.
Upon the assumption that the Court might be prepared in some
contentious cases to make independent inquiries into facts, what oppor-
tunities for independent inquiry are open to the Court? At the present
time, the Court seems to take it for granted that if the parties are in
agreement on the facts, the facts agreed upon will be taken as the
basis of the decision. In this situation the State parties determine
the allocation of intelligence tasks.
The likelihood of a dispute as to facts is fairly remote. This is
not because the parties are anxious to quickly reach a peaceful solu-
tion but simply because neither party has enough facts to question
the facts submitted by the other. Records may be lost, the events in
question may have occurred within the territory of one of the parties,
or the case might be pitched on events long passed. When the facts
do get into dispute in the usual proceeding on the merits it is because
one of the parties by espionage or other informal practices has suc-
ceeded in penetrating the barriers to the flow of information established
by the other.
In the Oscar Chinn Case93 the British were unable to dispute the
Belgian allegations of fact concerning the de facto monopoly alleged
by the British because the evidence the British needed was in the
Belgian Congo. The British had no access to the facts and the Court
was not prepared to get the facts for them. In the Nottebohm Case94
Guatemala could not make an issue of fact concerning the alleged fraud
of Nottebohm in obtaining Liechtenstein nationality because it could
not have access to the necessary records in Liechtenstein. In the
Corfu Channel Case the British took the necessary evidence to raise
an issue of fact with Albania by sweeping mines in the Corfu Channel
over Albania's protest. The British case for Yugoslav participation
in the mining was built on the testimony of a Yugoslav officer who
left Yugoslavia after the mining incident and who did not come to
92. Serbian Loans Issued in France, supra note 91 at 39.
93. P.C.I.J., Ser. A/B, No. 63 (1934).
94. (Second Phase) Judgment of April 6, 1955, [1955] I.C.J. Rep. 4.
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the attention of the British until after their case had left the Security
Council. If the Court is confronted with a dispute of fact, the dispute
tends to be eased upon information obtained informally so that the
Court is likely to have difficulty in any investigation it undertakes.
If the facts are not disputed by the parties, there are several
situations in contentious proceedings in which the Court might see
fit to make independent inquiries but has not yet done so to any appre-
ciable extent. In a number of contentious cases the Court must hear a
preliminary objection to its jurisdiction before proceeding to the merits.
The Court determines its own jurisdiction but clearly cannot do so
unless some of the facts of the case are considered. The Court has
taken a pragmatic approach to the problem by holding that if an ex-
cursion. into facts is necessary on the issue of jurisdiction, the facts
will be considered de novo on the merits. 5 This is painless dentistry.
If a State appears to raise the issue of jurisdiction and is not coopera-
tive in producing facts, the Court may take the position that it is free
to investigate for the limited purpose of determining its jurisdiction.
No institution other than the Court can determine jurisdiction and
the question of jurisdiction must be answered. 6
The Court may request information from public international
organizations relative to cases before it.9T  This may be done at the
initiative of the Court or at the request of one of the parties." The
privilege to request information applies to advisory as well as con-
tentious proceedings and would seem to apply to proceedings upon
preliminary objections as well as to proceedings on the merits.
A State not originally a party to contentious litigation may inter-
vene. This may inject new facts and create a dispute. A State may
intervene as a matter of right if a convention to which it is a party
is being construed.99 It may intervene with Court consent if it has
a legal interest which might be affected adversely by the decision. 100
95. German interests in Polish Upper Silesia (The Chorzow and Rural Estates
case) (Jurisdiction) P.C.I.J., Ser. A, No. 6, at 15-16 (1925). If it would be impractical
to consider the jurisdictional issue without a full consideration of the facts on the
merits, the Court will join the jurisdictional question and the issue on the merits.
E.g., Pajzs, Czaky, Esterhazy case (Preliminary Objection), P.C.I.J., Ser. A/B,
No. 66 (Order of May 23, 1936). In the Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. case (Jurisdiction)
Judgment of July 22, 1952, [1952] I.C.J. Rep. 93, 149, Judge Read considered that
the Court had improperly decided the merits of the British treaty claim in ruling upon
the jurisdictional issue. The treaty had been put in issue by the British in an effort
to establish jurisdiction.
96. STAT. INT'L CT. JUST. art. 36, t 6.
97. Id. art. 34, 2.
98. RULES INT'L CT. JUST. art. 57 (3).
99. STAT. INT'L CT. JUST. art. 63.
100. Id. art. 62.
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There have been two formal interventions.101 Neither appear to have
added significant facts to the proceedings. Informal interventions have
been attempted. In the Corfu Channel Case Yugoslavia sought to im-
peach the testimony of a witness for the United Kingdom, Kovacic,
by a communique and introduced evidence through the Albanian Agent.
The Court received the evidence because it was anxious "for full
light to be thrown on the facts alleged"."0 2 The Court admitted the
evidence with reservations and refused to express an opinion on its
probative value. In the Mosul Case.. an advisory opinion involving a
boundary dispute between Turkey and Iraq, Turkey boycotted the
proceeding but, in addition to answering questions from the Court
in writing, requested a French publicist to submit an opinion on the
issue directly to each member of the Court. The Court did not con-
sider the opinion because it was not official and had not been examined
by the Turkish Government.
A public international organization may offer information on its
own initiative in a contentious proceeding.' The Registrar notifies
a public international organization when its constitutional instrument
or a treaty made under its auspices is being construed. 05 The Court
reserves the right to require the information to be supplemented.' 016
The organization does not become a party to the proceeding in a tech-
nical sense.
If the Court takes interim measures of protection, additional facts
may emanate from three sources.107 As a result of the interim measures
the parties may reappraise their positions and the facts of the contro-
versy and produce new facts when the proceeding on the merit com-
r.mences. A dispute in which interim measures are necessary will prob-
ably be a matter of interest to the Security Council. It must be in-
formed of interim measures ordered. The Security Council through its
commissions of investigation may supervise the execution of interim
measures and new facts may flow to the Court from the United Nations.
The Court may also recommend the establishment of a Committee to
supervise interim measures. This was done in the Anglo-Iranian Oil Co.
Case. Iran, however, refused to comply with the order and the com-
mittee was never established. A requirement might be made that
101. The S.S. "Wimbledon," 11 P.C.I.J., Ser. A, No. 1 (1923) (Poland); Haya
de la Torre case, Judgment of June 13, 1951, [1951] I.C.J. Rep. 71 (Cuba).
102. Judgment of April 9, 1949 [1949] I.C.J. Rep. 4, at 14.
103. P.C.I.J., Ser. B, No. 12 (1925).
104. STAT. INT'L CT. JUST. art. 34, f 2.
105. Id. art. 34, 1 3.
106. RuLEs INT'L CT. JUST. art. 57 (4).
107. STAT. INT'L CT. JUST. art. 41; RuLEs INT'L CT. JUST. art. 61.
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the Committee submit reports to the Court concerning the execution
of the measures ordered. No requirement of this sort was made in
the Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. Case..' Interim measures have been re-
quested in seven cases and granted in three. °9 In no case in which
interim measures have been granted have substantial additional facts
been brought before the Court as a result.
During oral proceedings, which are always held in contentious
cases,"' the judges of the Court may question agents and counsel."'
The rules of Court provide that any member may question but must
first make his intention known to the President who controls the
hearing." 2 Agents and counsel, however, are at liberty to answer
immediately or can delay their answer until a later date."' The right
of agents and counsel to delay their answers, which they usually do,
has deprived questioning by the Court of much of its value as a device
to wring admissions of fact. The authority of a member of the Court
to question does not extend to authority to request the production
of documents." 4 The question must likewise be relevant to the terms
of the dispute before the Court." 5
The necessity of simultaneous translation in World Court pro-
ceedings has meant that the Court waits until counsel completes his
statement and then presents its questions as a group. Sometimes the
President of the Court collects the questions and presents them. Sir
Frank Soskice, British Solicitor General and examining counsel in the
Corfu Channel Case, has commented that the delay in putting ques-
tions deprives the proceeding of the conversational interplay between
bench and bar to which English lawyers are accustomed." 6
Requests for interpretation or revision of a judgment may pro-
duce new facts. A judgment of the Court is final and without appeal.
108. In this connection consider the previous recommendations in this article for
utilization of the appointing power as a technique for obtaining information. The
board contemplated was to be composed of two members named by each of the States
and a fifth member who was to be a national of a third State and either selected
by the parties or designated by the President of the Court.
109. In addition to the measures granted in the Anglo-Iranian Oil Case, interim
measures were granted in the Case of Denunciation of the Treaty of November 2,
1865, between China and Belgium, P.C.I.J., Ser. A, No. 8 (Orders of Jan. 8, Feb. 15
and June 18, 1927) and in Electricity Company of Sofia and Bulgaria, P.C.I.J.,
Ser. A, No. 13, at 21 (1921).
110. STAT. INT'I, CT. JUST. art. 43, f" 1. Oral proceedings are optional in advisory
cases but usually are held.
111. STAT. INT'L CT. JUST. art. 48. The statute does not state that any member
of the Court may question but this authority is easily implied from the provisions.
112. RuLs INT'L CT. JUST. art. 52 (1-2).
113. Id. art. 52 (3).
114. P.C.I.J., Ser. E, No. 13, at 150, 151.
115. P.C.I.J., Ser. E, No. 2, at 189.
116. Soskice, Some Practical Considerations Affecting the Administration of
International Law, 37 TRANS. GROT. Soc. 127, 128 (1952).
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But if it is found difficult to apply the decision to the facts existing
at the time it is rendered, the Court may be requested to construe
the judgment."' The Court has stated that it will not examine facts
other than those considered in its judgment and will not consider
supervening facts when the judgment is interpreted."" The Court,
however, can not interpret in the abstract its own judgment any more
than a Court can interpret a statute of a legislature without consider-
ing the facts to which it is being applied. In the Case of Interpretation
of Judgments Nos. 7 and 8 (The Chorzow Factory),"9 the Court
agreed to interpret a passage in Judgment No. 7: "If Poland wishes
to dispute the validity of this entry, it can, in any case, only be an-
nulled in pursuance of a decision given by the competent tribunal."
Poland had contended that the land-book entry was invalid, and, after
the judgment, commenced a proceeding before the Tribunal of Kato-
wice to annul it. The Court was required to interpret the passage in
Judgment No. 7 in the light of the supervening act by Poland in com-
mencing annulment proceedings before its own tribunal. The super-
vening act provoked the request for interpretation.
How far the Court will consider new facts in the guise of in-
terpretation is presently an open question. Clearly the Court will not
entertain a new line of factual argument not originally submitted.
Thus in the Columbian-Peruvian Asylum Case"' Columbia presented
an abstract question whether Columbia was "competent, as the country
to qualify the offense for the purpose of said asylum." The Court
answered the question in the abstract: Columbia did not have a right
to qualify the nature of the offense by a unilateral and definitive de-
cision binding on Peru. But the Court held that there was no urgency
justifying the asylum, although Mr. de la Torre, the refugee in ques-
tion, was not a common criminal as contended by Peru. While this
decision disposed of an abstract question presented by Columbia, it
did not dispose of Mr. de la Torre who was still in the Columbian
embassy at Lima. On the day the judgment was rendered, Columbia
requested an interpretation. The Court refused to give this inter-
pretation, noting that it had not passed on the issue whether Colum-
bia's qualification was in fact correct. The purpose of the request must
117. STAT. INT'L CT. JusT. art. 60.
118. Interpretation of Judgments Nos. 7 and 8 (The Chorzow Factory), P.C.I.J.,
Ser. A, No. 13, at 21 (1921).
119. Id. at 123.
120. Judgment of November 20, 1950 [1950] I.C.J. Rep. 266.
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be to obtain an interpretation of the judgment and not to answer a
question not yet decided.' 2'
If one of the 'parties can produce a new fact which has been dis-
covered after the judgment has been rendered, it may be possible to
revise the judgment. 22 It is unlikely that revision will become a very
significant part of the jurisprudence of the Court because of the con-
ditions imposed in the statute. There can be no revision more than
ten years after the date of judgment. The application for revision must
be made within six months after discovery of the fact. The fact must
be a decisive factor. It must have been unknown to the Court at the
time of the decision and also unknown at that time to the party claim-
ing revision. The party cannot claim revision if its ignorance was
due to negligence. There have been no cases of revision by the Court
and there are unlikely to be any unless the statute is substantially
modified. 2
3
D. Allocation of the Intelligence Task in Advisory Cases.
In contrast to the restricted rule of the Court in allocating fact-
finding missions in contentious cases, in advisory cases the ultimate
decision as to who finds what facts and where the facts are to be found
rests with the Court. There are several reasons for this. The most
important reason is that the statute of the Court places no substantial
limits upon its activity in advisory cases.' 24 Also, while advisory de-
cisions may be binding in a moral sense and are usually accepted by
the organizations or States concerned, the advisory decision is bind-
ing in a legal sense only when the parties have agreed by treaty or
convention that the advisory opinion is to bind.'25 States have little
to lose and much to gain by participating in advisory proceedings. The
Security Council and the General Assembly may request advisory
opinions. Likewise other organs of the United Nations and the
specialized agencies may make the requests when authorized by the
General Assembly. 26 A State cannot request an advisory opinion di-
rectly but may be able to persuade the General Assembly or some other
organization authorized to seek advisory opinions to make the request
121. Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of November 20, 1950, [1950]
I.C.J. Rep. 395.
122. STAT. INT'L CT. JusT. art. 61.
123. See note 84 supra, with reference to production of a document by the
Yugoslavs that might have been used for revision if presented to the Court.
124. STAT. INT'L CT. JUST. art. 68.
125. In some instances international organizations have agreed that advisory
opinions will be binding upon them. See I.C.J. YgARBOOK (1955-56) 39.
126. U.N. CHARTMR art. 96.
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for it. When the General Assembly requests an advisory opinion,
the fact gathering resources of the United Nations are at the disposi-
tion of the Court.12 7  The Secretary-General is instructed to furnish
the Court with the necessary documents and provide it with other neces-
sary assistance. He has invariably done this.
While the predisposition of the Court to regard administrative
findings and State submissions as conclusive weighs as heavily in ad-
visory proceedings as in contentious litigation, the predisposition is
not supplemented by restrictions in the statute or cultivated by State
resistance to independent inquiry by the Court. The Court has ex-
hibited initiative in advisory proceedings that has been lacking in
much of the contentious litigation. It has, for example, agreed to
allow the International Federation of Trade Unions to produce wit-
nesses and make statements,'12 it has received statements from political
parties in the City of Danzig, 2 " and has received a decision of the
High Court of Danzig after the proceedings in the case were closed,
the decision being received from an official of the Free City other
than its court agent.'3 0 Usually several international organizations and
three or more States are heard in each advisory proceeding. It should
also be observed that the major contributions of the International
Court of Justice to the doctrine of international law have been made
in advisory cases. 131
The advisory proceeding is the ideal vehicle for fact-finding activity
by the Court. The Court cannot volunteer opinions. An international
organization qualified to do so must request them. 1 2 But is it possible
that factually static contentious litigation may be short circuited into
ductile advisory proceedings in which the Court might be prepared
to make independent findings? The General Assembly is gradually
assuming the executive functions of the Security Council; and is not
blocked by a veto. To what extent can the General Assembly put be-
127. The General Assembly has requested all advisory opinions except one which
was requested by UNESCO.
128. Competence of the International Labor Organization to Regulate, Inciden-
tally, the Personal Work of Employers, P.C.I.J., Ser. B, No. 13 (1936). The witnesses
ultimately were not produced. See P.C.I.J., Ser. E, No. 13 at 213.
129. P.C.I.J., Ser. E, No. 12 at 199.
130. P.C.I.J., Ser. E, No. 12 at 196. The Court said that it accepted the decision
as information and not as evidence.
131. Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations,
Advisory Opinion of April 11, 1949, [1949] I.C.J. Rep. 174 (status of the United
Nations to protect its agents) ; Effect of Awards of Compensation made by the United
Nations Administrative Tribunal, Advisory Opinion of July 13, 1954, [1954] I.C.J.
Rep. 47 (implied power of the United Nations to establish administrative tribunal).
132. U.N. CHARTMR art. 96.
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fore the Court State disputes in the guise of advisory requests? This
is one of the sensitive issues before the Court today.
The present position of the Court appears to be as follows: The
Court is entitled to withhold an advisory opinion and will do so if its
opinion requires a decision directly upon the merits of a State dispute
and one or more of the States concerned do not participate in the
proceeding. This may also be the case when the States participate in
the proceeding, but a request for an opinion should not in principle
be refused.' 83 When the opinion relates to legal grounds actually pend-
ing between States, the opinion has no binding force. However, no
State, whether a member of the United Nations or not, can prevent
the giving of an advisory opinion which the United Nations deems
desirable for its guidance." 4 The Court is not concerned with the
political motive of the General Assembly in submitting a request for
an opinion."' The Court is the principal judicial organ of the United
Nations and will function accordingly. The rules provide that if the
request for an advisory opinion relates to legal questions actually
pending between States the provisions of the statute relating to ad hoc
judges shall apply." 6 In applying the provisions of the statute re-
lating to contentious proceedings to advisory proceedings the Court
has stated that it will "above all consider whether the advisory opinion
relates to a legal question actually pending between two or more
States."' 8
Since 1946, the General Assembly, which has requested all except
one of the advisory opinions, has presented its questions in abstract
form. In at least one instance the question was so abstract that the
Court could not answer it directly. This tactic of the General Assembly
has not prevented States from appearing and attacking the jurisdic-
tion of the Court.1 38
The judges likewise must consider the experience of the Perma-
nent Court in "advisory arbitration." ''  The League Covenant pro-
vided that the Court could give an advisory opinion upon any dispute
133. Reservations to the Convention on Genocide, Advisory Opinion of May
28, 1951, [1951] I.C.J. Rep. 15.
134. Interpretation of Peace Treaties, Advisory Opinion of March 30, 1950,
[1950] I.C.J. Rep. 65.
135. Admission of a State to the United Nations (Charter Art. 4), Advisory
Opinion of May 28, 1948, [1948] I.C.J. Rep. 57.
136. RULES INT'L CT. JusT. art. 83.
137. RuLts INT'L CT. JUST. art. 82 (1).
138. See Interpretation of Peace Treaties, Advisory Opinion of March 30, 1950,
[1950] I.C.J. Rep. 65; Admission of a State to the United Nations (Charter Art. 4),
Advisory Opinion of May 28, 1948, [1948] I.C.J. Rep. 57.
139. See the individual opinion of Judge Azevedo in Admission of a State to the
United Nations, note 138 supra, at 73.
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or question referred to it by the Council or Assembly. As the practice
in advisory cases developed, the Council of the League, the executive
body, made all requests for advisory opinions. The second request by
the Council for an opinion was refused in The Status of Eastern
Carelia."4 ° The case involved Russia's obligations under the Treaty
of Dorpat relative to certain communes under Finnish protection which
had been attached to Eastern Carelia. Russia refused to participate
in the proceeding. The Court refused to render an opinion on the
ground that Russia had not consented to a decision by the Court. The
Court noted that it would be at a disadvantage in finding facts if
Russia did not participate.'
In subsequent cases the Court gave advisory opinions involving
State disputes when the merits were not directly in issue. These
opinions did, however, interpret treaty obligations or international
customary legal obligations in such a way that the decisions condi-
tioned settlements ultimately made by the parties. In the Mosul Case,
in which Turkey refused to participate directly, the Court took pains
to point out that its opinion related directly to the question addressed
by the Council and that the merits of the dispute before the Council
were in no way prejudged. The practice of advisory arbitration
reached its high point in the case of Customs Regime Between Germany
and Austria.4 2 in which political motives were imputed to the Court.
Thereafter the practice was continued but with greater caution.
The statute of the International Court of Justice limits the ad-
visory jurisdiction of the Court to "legal" questions. 4 3 This limitation
does not appear to confine the Court solely to abstract questions of
law, but the change in the statute, coupled with resistance from within
the Court, may mean that the practice of advisory arbitration will
never be as flexible or as common as under the League.'44
IV.
SURVEILLANCE PRACTICES.
The Court may have no reasonable opportunity to find facts be-
cause the decision as to who will find the facts and where the facts
will be sought rests elsewhere. If the Court does have an opportunity
140. P.C.I.J., Ser. B, No. 5 (1923). The first request was in Nationality Decrees
in Tunis and Morocco, P.C.I.J., Ser. B, No. 4 (1923).
141. Status of Eastern Carelia, note 140 supra, at 28.
142. P.C.I.J., Ser. A/B, No. 41 (1931).
143. STAT. INT'L CT. JUST. art. 65, J 1.
144. See the separate opinion of Judge Azevedo in Interpretation of Peace
Treaties, Advisory Opinion of March 30, 1950, [1950] I.C.J. Rep. 65, 81.
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to find facts the inertia produced by the predispositions of the judges
may prevent it from taking advantage of the opportunity. But upon
the assumption that the Court will decide to make independent in-
quiries, how does the Court make them?
The rest of this article deals with four major problems produced
by surveillance practices: procuring and use of testimony by witnesses;
use of expert inquiries; rules of evidence; and State security restric-
tions. No effort is made to discuss rules of evidence exhaustively
since several excellent treatments of this subject are now in print.'45
There have been few contentious cases before the Court in which
the parties have disputed the facts. Of these, the Corfu Channel Case
sheds more light upon the difficulties of independent inquiry by the
Court than any other. The case is a judicial landmark and figures
prominently in the subsequent discussion. 146
145. SANDIER, EVIDENCE BEFORE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS (1939); WITN-
BERG, La Theorie des Preuves devant les Jurisdictions Internationales, 56 HAGUE
REcuEIL 5 (1936).
146. In view of numerous references to this case in the subsequent materials the
facts of the case are stated briefly here. On October 22, 1946, two British destroyers,
H.M.S. "Saumarez" and H.M.S. "Volage" struck mines while passing through the
fairway of the Corfu Channel. These vessels were part of a squadron passing through
the Channel subject to secret British orders X.C.U. Upon receipt of the report of the
mining, the Central International Mine Clearance Board recommended that the
channel be reswept at a favorable opportunity (the channel having been swept prior
to October 1946), but stated that the sweeping of the channel remained an issue out-
side its scope. The British nevertheless swept the channel on the 12th and 13th of
November, 1946 (Operation Retail). A member of the Mediterranean Mine Clearance
Board, Commander Mestre, attended the sweeping as an observer. Two German G-Y
mines were recovered and taken to Malta for inspection. Diplomatic negotiations with
Albania having failed, the British took the case before the Security Council under
Article 35 of the Charter. Albania accepted an invitation to attend the Security
Council proceedings upon condition of her acceptance, for the purposes of the dispute,
of the obligations of a member of the United Nations. The Security Council appointed
a subcommittee to investigate the facts, and the report of this committee was con-
sidered by the Council. Ultimately, a finding by the Council adverse to Albania was
blocked by the veto, but a British resolution referred the case to the World Court.
The British brought the case before the Court by application, and Albania raised a
preliminary question of jurisdiction on the ground that the case should have been
submitted by special agreement. The Court decided that it was unnecessary to pass
upon this issue because Albania had voluntarily accepted its jurisdiction by a letter of
July 2, 1947. Corfu Channel Case (Preliminary Objection), Judgment of March 25,
1948, [1947-48] I.C.J. Rep. 15.
Immediately after this decision the case was submitted by special agreement. The
claim of the United Kingdom in this agreement was Albanian responsibility for the
explosions and liability for the resulting damages. The British case was that the
mines were laid by Yugoslavia with Albanian connivance or that Albania knew the
mines had been laid and failed to give notice as required by international law. Albania
counterclaimed that the United Kingdom had violated her sovereignty on October 22,
1946, not having been in innocent passage, and had again violated her sovereignty in
Operation Retail on the 12th and 13th of November 1946. After hearing witnesses
and directing an expert inquiry on the spot, the Court gave judgment for the British
on their claim on the ground that Albania knew or should have known of the mining
and failed to give warning; the court gave judgment for Albania on that part of her
counterclaim pertaining to Operation Retail. The Court determined the indemnity in
a separate proceeding in which Albania refused to participate. A second committee of
experts was formed to aid the Court in determining the indemnity due. The indemnity
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A. Testimony by Witnesses.
Witnesses have testified before the Court in German Interests in
Upper Silesia.47 and the Corfu Channel Case. In the case of Greco-
Bulgarian Communities45 the Court may have questioned the Acting
President of the Mixed Commission. 149 This officer was present as an
expert and not as a general witness. In its examination of the canals
and locks in Diversion of the Water from the Meuse... the Court heard
explanations on the spot given by representatives who had been desig-
nated by the parties for the purpose.' The Committee of Experts
which conducted an investigation on the spot in the Corfu Channel
Case appears to have questioned the members of its escort and perhaps
some natives of the locality, but this questioning appears to have been
informal in nature. 152 In other cases in which counsel have suggested
that witnesses be called, the witnesses have not in fact been heard. 15 a
Because of the limited opportunities of the Court to receive the testi-
mony of witnesses, only rudimentary techniques for handling the
testimony of witnesses have been developed. The judges have tended
to draw heavily upon the Anglo-American experience in handling
witnesses, although in other matters of evidence the Court seems to
have been influenced by the Civil Law.
Unless the parties produce witnesses voluntarily, the Court must
apply to the government of the State upon the territory of which the
subpoena is to be served to have the witness produced.'" Many States
appear to lack any law requiring compulsory production of witnesses
in international judicial proceedings.' 55
was set at £843,947 in favor of the United Kingdom. The decision was considered
a sufficient award for Albania on her counterclaim. Corfu Channel Case, Judgment
of December 15, 1949, [1949] I.C.J. Rep. 244.
147. P.C.I.J., Ser. A, No. 7 (1926).
148. P.C.I.J., Ser. B, No. 17 (1930).
149. The writer does not have access to the necessary records to determine
whether this officer was questioned or not.
150. P.C.I.J., Ser. A/B, No. 70 (1937).
151. While minutes were made of the proceeding, there is no indication that the
representatives were subject to cross-examination or extensive interrogation.
152. Judgment of April 9, 1949, [1949] I.C.J. Rep. 4, at 154, 158, 161, 166. It is
unlikely that either the Albanians or the Yugoslavs would have permitted intensive
examination of any witnesses other than those selected for the purpose because of
the possibility of divulgence of information not related directly to the investigation.
153. Legal Status of Eastern Greenland, P.C.I.J., Ser. A/B, No. 53, at 25 (1933) ;
P.C.I.J., Ser. C, No. 67, at 4123, 4126; Personal Work of Employers Case, P.C.I.J.,
Ser. B, No. 13 (1926) ; P.C.I.J., Ser. E, No. 3, at 213; Pajzs, Czaky, Esterhazy Case,
P.C.I.J., Ser. A/B, No. 68 (1936) ; P.C.I.J., Ser. E, No. 13, at 150.
154. STAT. INT'L CT. JUST. art. 44, ff 1.
155. See Anderson, Production of Evidence by Subpoena before International
Tribunals, 27 AM. J. INT'L L, 498 (1933) ; Jessup, National Sanctions for International
Tribunals, 20 A.B.A.J. 55 (1934); HUDSON, THE PERMANENT COURT OF INTER-
NATIONAL JUSTICE (1920-1942) 569 (1943).
FALL 1958]
31
Alford: Fact Finding by the World Court
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1958
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
Within sufficient time prior to the commencement of the oral
proceedings each party is required to name its witnesses, designate
their place of residence and indicate in general the points towards
which the testimony of the witnesses will be directed. 5 ' If the Court
requests the parties to call witnesses or experts157 the Court must bear
the expense of producing them. 5 " If the witness is not called by the
Court, each party must bear the expense of its own witnesses.
In German Interests in Upper Silesia5" an issue of fact was pre-
sented whether it was necessary for certain mining interests to control
the super-jacent land in order to prevent subsidence of the soil. The
Court, by order, called upon the parties to present at a public hearing
"by whatever means they thought fit" evidence relating to the points
reserved, subject to the right of the Court to make good any insuffi-
ciency in the evidence by the means provided by its statute.'"6
Germany produced four expert witnesses and Poland produced
one. At the hearing the witnesses were sworn and were examined
directly by the producing party and then cross-examined by the opposing
party. After examination the witnesses were questioned by some of
the judges.
The witnesses answered in Polish or German, neither of which
were official languages of the Court. Each party was responsible for
translating the testimony of its witnesses into both official languages
of the Court.'"' The French version of the testimony was regarded as
authentic in case of conflict. A record of the French translation was
sent to the agent of the parties for examination by the witnesses.
Whether the witnesses could actually read the translation does not
appear. They were, however, allowed to submit further depositions if
they felt that their testimony would be clarified by additional observa-
tions. The record was read to the witnesses for signature and approval
at a public meeting of the Court. One of the German witnesses was
not present at this meeting, having authorized the German agent to
sign his testimony by proxy. The Court disregarded the testimony
because it had not been read to the witness or signed by him.'1 2
156. RULES INT'L CT. JUST. art. 49.
157. Id. art. 54.
158. Id. art. 55.
159. P.C.I.J., Ser. A, No. 7 (1926).
160. Id. at 96.
161. See P.C.I.J., Ser. C, No. 11, at 25-36; Ser. E, No. 2, at 110. The proceeding
is discussed in HUDSON, THE PERMANENT COURT OV INTERNATIONAL JUsTICE (1920-
1942) 570 (1943); SANDIrFR, EVIiENCE BEFORE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS 222
(1939).
162. See P.C.I.J., Ser. C, No. 11, at 25-36.
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In the Corfu Channel Case it was clear well in advance of the
proceeding that there would be a hotly contested issue of fact and
that both parties would produce witnesses and experts. The Special
Agreement between the United Kingdom and Albania provided that
the Court should make such orders with regard to procedure in con-
formity with the statute and the rules of Court as it deemed fit after
having consulted the agents of the parties.
Sir Eric Beckett, the British agent, and Mr. Kahreman Ylli,
the Albanian agent, submitted to the Registrar, prior to the oral
proceedings, the names of the persons who would be present at the
Hague during the course of the hearings and who would be available
for call as witnesses by the Court or by the parties depending upon
the course of debate.163 Affidavits had been filed by the British which
set forth the testimony, in general, that their witnesses would give if
called. After two British requests, the Albanian agent also submitted
a statement of the substance of the testimony his witnesses would
offer.16
The general plan of procedure was arranged at a meeting between
the President of the Court and the agents on November 8, 1948, a
day prior to commencement of the oral proceedings. In general, the
plan was that two British counsel would make opening statements
followed by an answer by counsel for Albania. Then the witnesses
were to be examined. The British were then to make their reply
approximately twenty-four hours after the last of the witnesses was
heard and the Albanian counsel would then make their rejoinder.'65
As soon as the first part of the oral arguments had been completed
the President ordered the agents to inform the Registrar of the par-
ticulars of the witnesses whom they proposed to call.
The hearing of witnesses commenced on November 22, 1948, and
lasted until December 14, 1948. Except for those witnesses who were
163. 5 CORPU CHANNEL CASE - PLEADINGS, ORAL ARGUMENTS, AND DOCUMENTS
183, 189, 195, 217 (I.C.J. 1948). The British witnesses designated and ultimately
called were Lieut. Comm. Karel Kovacic, formerly of the Yugoslav Navy; Captain
W. H. Selby, Captain of H.M.S. "Saumarez"; Commander R. T. Paul, Captain of
H.M.S. "Volage"; Commander Q. P. Whitford; Commander E. R. D. Sworder;
Lieut. Comm. P. K. Lankester; and Commander Paul Mestre of the French Navy.
The Albanian witnesses were Captain Ali Shtino, Harbor-master at Saranda, Albania;
Captain Aquile Polena, Coast Defense Commander at Saranda; M. Xhavit Muco,
Vice President of the Executive Council at Saranda. As experts the Albanians offered
Rear Admiral Raymond Moullec of the French Navy and Captain Branimir Ormanov,
Chief of Staff of the Bulgarian Black Sea Fleet. Albania also named M. Mikhalo
Stojakovic, Yugoslav Charge d'Affaires at the Hague, but he was not called. See
3 id. at 250.
164. 3 id. at 246; 5 id. at 196, 201.
165. 5 id. at 200.
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also appearing as experts, the witnesses were excluded from the hear-
ing until they were called. The witness was allowed to hear the
remainder of the testimony after he had testified.' 6 Before testifying,
the witnesses were required to make their declarations as required
by the rules. 6
The technique of simultaneous translation was used. In accord-
ance with the rules, statements made in one official language had to
be translated to the other official language.' 68 The requirement was
made for both questions and answers. This meant that when an Eng-
lish speaking counsel was examining an Albanian witness, the question
had to be translated into French and Albanian and the answer into
French and English. This not only delayed the proceedings but spoiled
the effect of cross-examination.' 9
Captain Ormanov, the Chief of Staff of the Bulgarian Black Sea
Fleet, an Albanian expert witness, complicated matters by answering
sometimes in English and sometimes in Russian.17 0 The interpreter's
difficulty with technical naval terms sometimes delayed and confused
the translation. 71 The translation was under the general supervision
of the Court.'7
2
The British witnesses were examined first. The interrogation
of witnesses was by counsel for the parties; general control over the
examination was exercised by the President of the Court.'7 Counsel
for the parties determined the order in which witnesses were called.' 7 4
The examination was conducted in the Anglo-American fashion.
The producing party examined the witness directly. The opposing
party then cross-examined. The witness was then questioned by the
President and members of the Court. The producing party then sub-
166. 5 id. at 220. There appears to have been no effort to exclude witnesses during
the opening arguments of counsel in which the general nature of the testimony to be
offered by the witnesses was discussed.
167. RULEs INT'L CT. JUST. art. 53. The witness declares: "I solemnly declare
upon my honor and conscience that I will speak the truth, the whole truth and nothing
but the truth." The expert declares: "I solemnly declare upon my hon6r and con-
science that my statement will be in accord with my sincere belief." Neither state-
ment is an oath in a technical sense.
168. RULES INT'L CT. JusT. art. 58 (1).
169. Soskice, Administration of International Law, 37 TRANS. GROT. Soc. 127,
128 (1951).
170. 4 CORVU CHANNEL CASE - PLEADINGS, ORAL ARGUMENTS, AND DOCUMENTS
317 (I.C.J. 1948).
171. 3 id. at 568.
172. RULES INT'L CT. JUST. art. 58 (2).
173. Id. art. 53 (1).
174. 3 CORVU CHANNEL CASE - PLEADINGS, ORAL ARGUMENTS, AND DOCUMENTS
173 (I.C.J. 1948). The United Kingdom called Commander Sworder as the first
expert witness. The President then suggested that Commander Whitford be called
as the second expert witness but counsel preferred to call Commander Kovacic.
Albania called its general witnesses first and then its expert witnesses.
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mitted the witness to re-direct examination and the opposing party,
if it so desired, could then subject the witness to re-cross-examination.
On cross-examination the opposing counsel was allowed to put new
questions to the witness and the producing counsel could put new
questions and add technical explanations on re-direct examination. In
the course of his ruling upon this matter the President made the follow-
ing observation:
"Our procedure is very liberal. There is no limit to the
number of questions that may be put. The Court has one wish,
and that is that as much light as possible should be cast upon
the matter discussed by the Court, and secondly the Court wishes
to give the Parties every opportunity to defend their point of
view . ..,"5
The British examination was conducted by Sir Frank Soskice,
Solicitor General. The examination for Albania was conducted by
M. Joe Nordmann and M. Pierre Cot of the French bar. The French
counsel, being accustomed to the French practice of examination by
the presiding judge, had initially some difficulty with the system of
examination selected by the Court but quickly warmed to their task.
In every instance counsel appeared to prefer a detailed examination of
the witness rather than putting a general question to the witness as
had been suggested by the President."'
The Court was required to rule infrequently on the conduct of
the examination. Most of the difficulty centered upon the testimony of
Commander Kovacic who testified concerning the British contention
that Yugoslav minelayers had placed the mines in the Corfu Channel
with the connivance of Albania. Prior to the hearings, an effort had
been made to impeach the testimony by means of a Yugoslav com-
munique.177 During his cross-examination of Commander Kovacic,
M. Cot produced a photostat of an identification paper and attempted
to use it in his examination. Sir Frank objected to the use of the
paper, his objection being based upon the best evidence rule.1 7' The
Court ruled that no question could be put to the witness based upon
the document unless it was presented in complete and original form.
The Court also ruled that no question could be put based on a docu-
175. Id. at 428.
176. See, for example, the detailed questioning of Commander Paul, the Captain
of "Volage" by Sir Frank Soskice and the equally detailed direct examination of
Captain Shtino by M. Cot. 4 id. at 9-25, 201-13.
177. 3 id. at 251.
178. 3 id. at 538-39.
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ment which had not been filed with the Registry.' 9 Subsequently
the Court ruled that the document not only must be filed with the
Registry but must have been distributed to the opposing party.1
80
In the course of his examination M. Cot also produced a calcula-
tion concerning the angle of the sun at Sibenik in Yugoslavia on the
date that Commander Kovacic had testified he had seen sun glinting
from mines on the decks of two Yugoslav minelayers. The British
desired that the accuracy of this calculation be checked by experts
before Commander Kovacic was questioned from it.' The calcula-
tion together with certain other technical questions was submitted to
a group of experts provided by both parties.8 2 The experts met in
another room while the examination of Commander Kovacic was
proceeding and reached a conclusion concerning the angle of the sun
before completion of the re-cross-examination by M. Cot. This con-
clusion appears to have been made known to counsel but M. Cot does
not appear to have used this conclusion in his examination. After
the Court adjourned for the day, Sir Frank apparently discusssed
the conclusion of the experts with Kovacic and requested the Court
to permit him to return Kovacic to the stand on the following day
to put further questions to him relating to the time he recalled making
his observation.8 8 M. Cot agreed to recall of the witness. The wit-
ness was examined by Sir Frank, then cross-examined by M. Cot and
questioned by Judge Ad Hoc Ecer. After Judge Ecer's questions,
M. Cot put further questions.'" The report of the experts was filed
after adjournment on the date that Commander Kovacic was recalled.' 85
In accordance with the Rules a shorthand transcript was made
of the testimony of each witness.' 6 This transcript was made avail-
able to the witness as soon as possible after his evidence was given.
The witness read the transcript and made necessary corrections. The
transcript was returned to the Registrar and the Registrar reported to
the Court any corrections made. When the transcript was approved by
the witness, he signed a certificate in the presence of the Registrar and
this was attached to the manuscript which was sealed and filed in the
179. 3 id. at 544-45.
180. 3 id. at 555.
181. 3 id. at 564.
182. 3 id. at 608, 616-20; 5 id. at 123. The experts were Commander Sworder,
Lt. Commander Lankester, Lt. Godsall, Admiral Moullec and Captain Ormanov.
183. 3 id. at 665.
184. 3 id. at 665-79.
185. 3 id. at 679. This report also related to questions put by Judge Ecer to
Lt. Commander Lankester. The questions were reduced to writing and submitted to
the committee upon the recommendation of M. Cot. 4 id. at 59; 5 id. at 126.
186. RULIS INT'L CT. JUST. art. 60 (1), (2).
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Registry. If a witness testified in one of the official languages of the
Court, the certified copy was the transcript of the language in which
he spoke. If the witness testified in other than an official language,
the translation into an official language arranged by the party con-
cerned under the supervision of the Court was the official text. ls7
The World Court cannot punish for contempt. It cannot punish
a witness for perjury. There is no immunity for a witness who gives
testimony inimical to the interests of the State of which he is a
national.'88 Because of the absence of power of the Court to deal with
a recalcitrant or perjured witness and because of the absence of im-
munity of the witness to legal action as a result of his testimony, the
Court makes no effort to compel a witness to testify. In the Corfu
Channel Case a reasonable ground for refusal to testify was respected
by the Court. Thus, Commander Kovacic refused to disclose the
name of the Yugoslav who told him that Sub-Lieutenant Drago
Blazevic had said that the Yugoslav minelayers placed mines in the
Corfu Channel. The question was withdrawn by M. Cot.18 9  Com-
mander Paul refused to answer a question by the President of the
Court concerning the British secret Order X.C.U.' 90 Commander
Lankester likewise refused to answer a question by M. Cot concern-
ing the same order.' 9 ' Commander Whitford refused to testify con-
cerning his special orders when being cross-examined by M. Cot.'92
As a result of the Corfu Channel Case the Court appears to have
developed rudimentary but sound techniques for hearing testimony
by witnesses. The efficiency of examination of witnesses and the care
in recording testimony is in marked contrast to the first efforts in
German Interests in Upper Silesia. It is likely that the Court will not
resort to the taking of depositions. This common practice in arbitral
proceedings would deprive the Court of an opportunity to observe
the demeanor of the witness and to put its own questions. Likewise,
while it appears that the Court is committed to the Anglo-American
187. 5 CORFU CHANNEL CASE - PLEADINGS, ORAL ARGUMENTS, AND DOCUMENTS
221 (I.C.J. 1948).
188. The witness has in the Netherlands the immunity necessary for the fulfil-
ment of his mission. I.C.J., Ser. D, No. 1, at 89. In 1946 the General Assembly
recommended that witnesses, experts and persons performing missions by order of
the Court should be accorded, during the period of their mission, including the time
spent on journeys in connection with their mission, the privileges and immunities
provided in Art. VI, § 22 of Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the United
Nations. I.C.J., Ser. D, No. 1, at 85.
189. 3 CORVU CHANNEL CASE - PLEADINGS, ORAL ARGUMENTS, AND DOCUMENTS
633-35 (I.C.J. 1948).
190. 4 id. at 27-28.
191. 4 id. at 77-78.
192. 4 id. at 185-86.
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type of examination, the practices of the Court in guiding the examina-
tion of witnesses are likely to be flexible. The flexibility of the Court's
procedures are well illustrated by the examination of Commander
Kovacic. The features which would enhance the effectiveness of the
use of testimony will require changes in the statute or the conclusion
of a special convention. The Court needs the authority to compel the
production of witnesses or at least the States should undertake to enact
national laws for the production of needed witnesses and documents.
It is also desirable that a witness be given immunity for testimony
offered before the Court. Immunity should extend to criminal prose-
cution if general immunity cannot be granted.
B. Special and Expert Inquiries.
The Court may make a special inquiry into facts, including in-
vestigations on the spot, in two ways. Members of the Court may be
commissioned to make the inquiry. Technical experts may be com-
missioned to investigate matters of a type for which their training
makes them particularly suitable.
The Court has power to create Special Chambers.19' In con-
tentious proceedings the use of Chambers requires the consent of the
parties. In advisory proceedings, however, the Court could use
Chambers as it saw fit."94 If Chambers were formed for the purpose of
investigation, the Chamber could not only investigate but also could
decide the case."95 The regular use of Chambers for this purpose
would, in effect, create a supplementary court system. Appeals could
not be taken to the World Court, however, without a change in the
statute. 6 On one occasion, the Court as a whole conducted an investi-
gation on the spot. In Diversion of Waters from the Meuse..7 the
Belgian agent suggested that the Court visit the installations, canals
and waterways to which the dispute related. The Netherlands agent
agreed. An itinerary was proposed by the parties and adopted by the
Court. The Court carried out the inspection in three'days, heard
193. STAT. INT'L CT. JUST. arts. 26-29. The Chamber may exercise its functions
elsewhere than at the Hague.
194. A literal construction of the existing rules appears to preclude the use of
Chambers having been used as of this date and the Summary Chamber having been
ever, makes its own rules and nothing in its statute seems to preclude the use of Cham-
bers in advisory opinions.
195. STAT. INT'L CT. JUST. art. 27.
196. It is probable that any use of Chambers as investigating-deciding bodies
will occur in advisory proceedings rather than in contentious litigation, no special
Chambers having been used as of this date and the Summary Chamber having been
used only once in formal proceedings. See note 35 supra.
197. P.C.I.J., Ser. A/B, No. 70 (1937).
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explanations by representatives designated by the parties and witnessed
practical demonstrations of the locks and connected installations. The
Meuse case is a weak precedent for expansion of investigating functions
by Chambers of the Court or by groups of judges and there is no sug-
gestion at this time that the Court contemplates the further use of such
techniques.'08
A commission of experts created under article 50 of the statute
was used once by the Permanent Court 99 and sought by parties on
other occasions."° The International Court of Justice has used expert
commissions twice. An expert commission was used in finding facts
on the merits in the Corfu Channel Case and a second commission was
formed to aid in setting the indemnity due the United Kingdom. 201
After the decision in German Interests in Upper Silesia in favor
of Germany, the Germans failed to agree with the Poles concerning
the value of the Chorzow Factory property. Having obtained an in-
terpretation of two of the previous judgments of the Court in the
Choraow litigation, Germany instituted an action to determine whether
indemnity was due and, if so, its amount. The Court determined
that indemnity was due but the parties failed to present adequate data
bearing upon the amount.20 2 The Court established a Commission
of Inquiry and reserved the fixing of an amount until the report of
this commission could be received.203
The President of the Court was directed to appoint three experts.
Each of the parties was authorized to appoint one assessor who was to
participate in the investigation in an advisory capacity. The experts
were to elect one of their number as chairman. The Registrar was
made responsible for secretarial assistance and for liaison between the
198. The Second Committee on Revision of Rules of the Permanent Court re-
ported in 1935 that it was unlikely that a Court of fifteen judges would attempt to
hear witnesses as in the case of German Interests in Upper Silesia but would delegate
a judge or nominate a commission to take the testimony. P.C.I.J., Ser. D, No. 2 (3d
add.) at 770. In Free Zones of Upper Savoy and the District of Gex, P.C.I.J., Ser.
A/B, No. 46 (1932), the special agreement by which the case was submitted con-
templated the use of members of the Court as a commission to investigate on the spot.
The appointment of such a commission was requested by one of the parties but was
never used.
199. The Factory at Chorzow (Claim for Indemnity - Merits), P.C.I.J., Ser. A,
No. 17 (1928).
200. See Free Zones of Upper Savoy and District of Gex, P.C.I.J., Ser. A/B,
No. 46 (1932); The Oscar Chinn Case, P.C.I.J., Ser. A/B, No. 63 (1934). In the
Chinn case at page 146, Judge van Eysinga noted "Indeed there has never been a case
before the Court in which the facts have been disputed to the same extent."
201. Judgment of December 15, 1949, [1949] I.C.J. Rep. 244.
202. The Factory at Chorzow (Claim for Indemnity - Merits) P.C.I.J., Ser. A,
No. 17 (1928).
203. Id. at 99.
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commission and the Court. The commission was authorized to ask for
any document, explanation or facilities it might consider useful in
carrying out its task. It might ask for authorization to inspect the
factories involved in the dispute. A decision to make the requests was
to be taken by a majority of the experts. The decision was to be
transmitted to the Registrar who would obtain the information or
authority needed or obtain the aid of the President." 4 The fees of
the experts were determined by the President. The experts were paid
by the Court and each party paid its own assessor. Other fees and
expenses were advanced by the Court and refunded by the parties.
Three technical questions were set forth in the order of the Court.2 °"
The report was to contain the reasoned opinion of each member of the
commission with respect to each question. The investigation was to
conform to the principles established by the decision of the Court and
the Registrar was to furnish the commission with the full record of
the proceeding and certain other proceedings related to the Chorzow
Factory. Each expert was required to swear that he would "abstain
from divulging or turning to my own use any secrets of an economic
or technical nature which may come to my knowledge in the per-
formance of this task."
It was contemplated that the report should be communicated to
the members of the Court and to the agents of the parties. A public
sitting would then be held at which the report would be discussed and
the experts questioned by the Court and agents. Fortunately for in-
ternational tranquility, and unfortunately for the experience of the
Court, no report was submitted. The experts held five meetings at
the Hague, assisted by assessors and a liaison officer. They decided
to make an inspection of the factories at Chorzow in Upper Silesia
and of certain factories in Germany. Before an inspection could be
made, the parties settled their dispute and the inquiry was terminated." 6
Before conclusion of the oral arguments in the Corfu Channel
Case, the President informed the agents that the Court was considering
an appointment of experts under article 57 of the rules.2 7 The British
agent suggested delay of the decision until the oral arguments were
204. The Register had general duty to reply to enquiries under Art. 24 of the
Rules. The President's authority to obtain the information was contained in STAT.
PER. CT. INT'L JUST. art. 49.
205. The order may be found in The Factory at Chorzow (Claim for Indemnity -
Merits) P.C.I.J., Ser. A, No. 17, at 99 (1928).
206. P.C.I.J., Ser. E, No. 5, at 200.
207. The Registrar made enquiries to make up a list of experts before the oral
proceedings commenced. 4 CORFU CIIANNEL CASE - PLEADINGS, ORAL ARGUMENTS,
AND DOCUMENTS 170 (I.C.J. 1948).
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completed.2 °8 By that time the Court could determine the technical
questions involved and the basic factual dispute. The Court appar-
ently reached its decision to appoint experts during or after the testi-
mony of Admiral Moullec which, in conjunction with Yugoslav docu-
ments, cast doubt upon some of the testimony of Commander Kovacic.
By the Court Order of December 17, 1948, Commodore J. Bull
of Norway, Commodore S. A. Forshell of Sweden and Lieut. Com-
mander S. J. W. Elfferich of the Netherlands were appointed as ex-
perts to give the Court "a precise and concrete opinion" upon the ques-
tions presented and the reasons for their findings. In its general ad-
ministrative details the order was similar to the one issued in ,the
Chorzow Case.2"' The questions presented to the experts, however,
went to the critical issues of the case. The experts were to examine
specified evidence to render an opinion as to what conclusions could
be drawn concerning the type mine that injured the vessels, whether
the mines were laid methodically, the purpose for which they were laid
and when they were laid. The experts were also to give an opinion
whether from the evidence Commander Kovacic could have seen G.Y.
mines being loaded upon the Yugoslav minelayers in Panikovac Cove,
how many G.Y. mines such a minelayer could carry and how long it
would take to load them with the facilities available. The experts
were requested to state an opinion on the main issue, the means em-
ployed to lay the minefield and whether the field could be laid without
Albanian authorities being aware of it.21 °
The experts elected Commodore Bull as chairman, considered
the evidence and submitted their unanimous report on January 8,
1949."' The experts concluded that the vessels had been damaged
by German G.Y. mines such as those recovered in "Operation Retail,"
that the field was laid methodically with an offensive-defensive object
(to stop ships from passing through the channel and prevent their
entry into Saranda Bay) and that the mines recovered had been in
the water a short time, but that no precise date could be established
for the laying of the field. The experts stated a number of possible
alternatives concerning the observations of Commander Kovacic but
were unable to give a definite answer. Likewise no definite answer
could be given to the question whether the Albanian authorities should
208. 5 id. at 210.
209. Corfu Channel Case, Order of December 17, 1948, [1947-48] I.C.J. Rep. 124.
210. The questions are paraphrased from the order. The questions were pre-
sented in great detail with a brief description of the evidence to be considered.
211. Corfu Channel Case, Judgment of April 9, 1949, [1949] I.C.J. Rep. 4, at 142.
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have known that the mines were laid, experiments relating to sight
and sound having been conducted at a Netherlands naval base. Copies
of the report were sent to the British and Albanian agents. The
Albanian copy was shown to the Yugoslavs. The Yugoslav Charge
d'Affaires at the Hague then brought certain inaccuracies in the re-
port to the attention of the President and suggested that the experts
make an investigation on the spot.2 12 The Albanians likewise agreed
to cooperate in an investigation at Saranda.213
When oral proceedings of the Court were resumed on January
17, 1949, the Court decided to send the experts to Sibenik in Yugo-
slavia and Saranda in Albania to make the necessary investigations.
The Registrar was instructed to make preparations for the inspection
and to insure that the experts had the facilities for the prompt accom-
plishment of their mission. The parties were entitled to file written
observations within one week following submission of the expert's
report.2 14  Commodore Bull was unable to make the inspection be-
cause of health and the parties secured the consent of the Court to
their appointment of experts to accompany the mission. Commander
Sworder was appointed by the United Kingdom and Captain Ormanov
by Albania.2"5 M. Garnier-Coignet, Deputy-Registrar, was appointed
to maintain liaison with the Court and to be responsible for relations
with authorities in Albania, Yugoslavia and the countries through
which the mission passed. A member of the Court's internal services
was assigned as courier.
The commission travelled by chartered plane and inspected the
Sibenik area on January 24 and 25, and the Saranda area on January
28 and 29, 1949. The Albanian and Yugoslav authorities were co-
operative and placed the necessary vessels and personnel at the dis-
posal of the experts for the conduct of the tests."' The character-
212. 5 CORFU CHANNEL CASE - PLEADINGS, ORAL ARGUMENTS, AND DOCUMENTS
253-54 (I.C.J. 1948).
213. Id. at 252.
214. Corfu Channel Case, Judgment of April 9, 1949, [1949] I.C.J. Rep. 4, at 151.
215. 5 CORFU CHANNEL CASE - PLEADINGS, ORAL ARGUMENTS, AND DOCUMENTS
259 (I.C.J. 1949).
216. There is a slight suggestion in the report of the experts that the Albanian
authorities were not frank in their statements concerning the watch kept on the coastal
areas. Corfu Channel Case, Judgment of April 9, 1949, [1949] I.C.J. Rep. 4, at 159.
Commander Sworder, the British expert who accompanied the mission, states that
"Captain Polena first said there were no buildings on Denta Point, and then, when the
experts insisted on trying to find the buildings, which they had observed from the sea,
Captain Polena led them to the wrong hill. Further efforts were made to prevent
the discovery of the post on the tower of the San Giorgio Monastery . . . [T]he door,
in fact, was forced open by Lieutenant Commander Elfferich. The Albanian authori-
ties refused to allow the lookout party under Commander Forshell to make observa-
tions from the tower of the Monastery." 5 CORFU CHANNEL CASE - PLEADINGS, ORAL
ARGUMENTS, AND DOCUMENTS 96 (I.C.J. 1948).
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istics of the quay at Sibenik and the facilities for storage of mines
were examined. Sight tests were made from a launch in Panikovac
Cove, the minelayer M-2, one of the vessels alleged to have laid the
mines, being moored at the time at the quay. The M-2 was inspected
by the experts and other features of Commander Kovacic's testimony
were checked. At Saranda, observations were made at night from
the San Giorgio Monastery of a ship completely blacked out and
running the course used to lay the mines in 1946. Both noise and
sight tests were made, although no mines actually were laid. Other
possible observation points in the Saranda area were examined.
In their report filed on February 8, 1949, the experts stated that
it is "indisputable that if a normal lookout was kept at Cape Kiephali,
Denta Point and San Giorgio Monastery, and if the lookouts were
equipped with binoculars as has been stated, under normal weather
conditions for this area, the mine laying operations must have been
noticed by the coast guards".217 Copies of the report were furnished
the parties and they filed brief observations upon it. Questions were
put to the experts in writing by three members of the Court and an-
swered by the experts on February 12, 1949.218
In its opinion on the merits the Court stated:
"The Court cannot fail to give great weight to the opinion
of the Experts who examined the locality in a manner giving
every guarantee of correct and impartial information ...
"From all the facts and observations mentioned above, the
Court draws the conclusion that the laying of the minefield which
caused the explosion on October 22nd, 1946, could not have
been accomplished without the knowledge of the Albanian Gov-
vernment."21 9
In the proceedings to establish the reparations due the United
Kingdom, Albania failed to appear and was held in default.22° The
Court referred the data furnished by the United Kingdom to two ex-
perts, Rear Admiral J. B. Berch of the Netherlands Navy and Mr.
G. de Rooy, Director of Naval Construction, Netherlands Navy. The
order was in the same general form as that used for the earlier com-
mission. No specific questions were put to the experts and the order
did not state what the experts were to report. Despite the inadequacy
217. Corfu Channel Case, Judgment of April 9, 1949, [1949] I.C.J. Rep. 4, at 161.
218. Id. at 163, 165.
219. Id. at 22.
220. Corfu Channel Case, Order of November 19, 1949, [1949] I.C.J. Rep. 237.
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of the order, the experts understood their task and filed a compre-
hensive report on December 1, 1949.221 The experts apparently worked
almost entirely from the data submitted by the British and information
placed at their disposal by the Royal Netherlands Navy. Blueprints
of a destroyer of the "Saumarez" class were available and the experts
had previously supervised the repair of damage similar to that sus-
tained by "Volage." The experts do not appear to have questioned
British personnel or to have examined the vessels or stores. It was
indicated in the report that the figures determined were an approxi-
mation as some of the equipment injured was secret and other equip-
ment had to be dismantled before the extent of damage could be de-
termined. The experts were examined by the Court at a special
sitting.
There is no reason to suppose that the technique of expert in-
quiries will cease to be used with the Corfu Channel Case. The value
of the information obtained from the experts was greater than that
of any evidence contributed by witnesses before the Court. The major
question is not whether the Court will be prepared to use an expert
inquiry on the spot in an appropriate case but whether the States
concerned will cooperate in allowing the experts access to information.
This is a factor difficult to appraise, but the national official does not
live who will refuse to trade information for values deemed of greater
advantage to his State. Albania was willing to go before the Court
because of her loss of moral prestige in proceedings before the Security
Counsel. She was prepared to receive investigators in an effort to
regain her position of respect in the Community of States.
C. Attitude of the Court Concerning Rules of Evidence.
Rules of evidence familiar in the Anglo-American legal system
have been rejected outright by the Court or, when received, modified
substantially before being applied. The World Court has no jury to
protect and the judges are confident of their own abilities to weigh
facts. Significant State interests being at stake in many of the cases
which the Court considers, the Court is not prepared to turn a case
on a technical rule of evidence or procedure.2 2 As Judge Van Eysinga
put the matter in the Oscar Chinn Case: ". . . [T]he Court is not tied
221. Corfu Channel Case, Judgment of December 15, 1949, [1949] I.C.J. Rep. 244,
at 258.
222. Free Zones of Upper Savoy and the District of Gex, P.C.I.J., Ser. A/B,
No. 46, at 155 (1932).
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to any system of taking evidence, . . . its task is to cooperate in the
objective ascertainment of the truth. 223
The Court seems to have reworked the rules of evidence which
it does apply with three objects in mind: (1) to bridge the gap left
by the non-production of evidence, (2) to enable the Court to weigh
the evidence submitted, and (3) to allow the opposing party to meet
the evidence introduced. Evidence is seldom excluded by the Court.
(1.) Unreasonable Searches and Seizures.
The Court appears to accept evidence no matter how it was
obtained by the party which produces it. In the Corfu Channel Case
evidence was admitted which had been obtained by espionage.224 Part
of the key evidence in the British case had been obtained by the in-
ternational equivalent of an "unreasonable search and seizure." After
the mining incident of October 22, 1946, the British swept the Corfu
channel in "Operation Retail" (November 1946) over the protest of
Albania. Twenty-two mines were cut and two mines, which proved
to be German mines of the G.Y. type, were recovered and taken to
Malta. The mines appeared to have been laid a short time before
the incident of 22 October. The Court admitted evidence obtained
from examination of the mines and related technical details. In answer
to Albania's counterclaim that the United Kingdom had violated her
sovereignty in "Operation Retail," the British argued that they were
securing evidence for the Court which might have been lost if the
mines had been removed by Albania or had been equipped with auto-
matic flooding devices. The British also argued that self help justified
their action. Both arguments were rejected by the Court and the United
Kingdom was held liable on the counterclaim. The evidence obtained,
however, formed part of the basis for the decision of the Court that
Albania was liable to the United Kingdom on the British claim.
An exclusion of evidence by the Court based upon the way in
which it was secured would be unrealistic in view of the known barriers
established by States to the flow of information. The Court is not
faced with the problem of intermittent police abuses of individuals
which national constitutional guarantees are designed to minimize.
The Court must get its evidence when and by whatever means it can
obtain it.
223. The Oscar Chinn Case, P.C.I.J., Ser. A/B, No. 63, at 146 (1934).
224. 3 CORFU CHANNEL CASE - PLEADINGS, ORAL ARGUMENTS, AND DocUMENTS
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(2.) Time Limits Upon Submission of Evidence.
Evidence can be submitted at any time with Court consent. The
Court will not consent if the opposing party will have no opportunity
to comment upon it or offer rebutting evidence.22 As a general propo-
sition, no further documents may be submitted by a party after the
close of written proceedings without consent by the other party. If
the other party does not object it is presumed to consent.226 If the
other party does object, the Court, after a hearing, determines whether
the evidence will be admitted or excluded. If the evidence is admitted,
the objecting party must have an opportunity to comment upon it
and submit documents in support of its contentions.227
If an agent or counsel refers to a document in his oral statement,
he is ordinarily expected to produce it. 2 8 Production is also required
if the document is to be used in the examination of witnesses.229
Comment upon unproduced documents has created difficulty. In
the Mavrommatis Case230 the Greek counsel was permitted to read an
extract from Hansard's Parliamentary Debates over objection by the
British counsel, the Court reserving its decision as to the importance
to be attached to the material.23' In the Peter Pazmany University
Case21 2 the Czech agent, before the opening of the hearings, announced
he intended to produce additional documents, of which he furnished
a list. He filed all of the documents except one and read most of
them during the hearings. The Hungarian agent then objected to
admission of the documents as evidence. The Court admitted all of
the documents except the document whichhad not been produced.
Whether the single document had been read during the hearings does
not appear from the opinion.283 In the Corfu Channel Case the British
225. The Court appears to have construed Articles 52, 45 and 48 of the Statute
as giving it full latitude to admit or exclude documents after the time set.
226. RuLEs INT'L CT. JUST. art. 48 (1).
227. Id. art. 48 (2). See Nottebohm Case (Second Phase), Judgment of April
6, 1955, [1955] I.C.J. Rep. 4, at 6. The principle has been pursued to such an extent
that the Court has withdrawn its request for a document when both parties objected
to its production. Pajzs, Czaky v. Esterhazy Case, P.C.I.J., Ser. A/B, No. 68 (1936)
P.C.I.J., Ser. E, No. 12, at 195.
228. Pajzs, Czaky, Esterhazy Case. See note 227 supra.
229. 3 CORVU CHANNEL CASE - PLEADINGS, ORAL ARGUMENTS, AND DOcUMENTS
555-56 (I.C.J. 1948).
230. P.C.I.J., Ser. A, No. 5 (1925).
231. P.C.I.J., Ser. E, No. 1, at 268.
232. P.C.I.J., Ser. A/B, No. 61 (1933).
233. The documents were accepted with "the usual reservations respecting the
value which the Court might decide to attach to them." Peter Pazmany University
Case, P.C.I.J., Ser. A/B, No. 61, at 215 (1933).
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counsel objected to documents offered by Albania in the course of
the oral hearings. A special hearing was held to determine whether
the documents should be admitted. During the hearing, the Albanian
counsel, in violation of the President's instructions, gave a resume
of the documents which he wished to introduce. The British agent
contended that the resume was inaccurate and gave his own resume.
The President reprimanded both representatives in open court.23 4 The
Court subsequently admitted the documents. There was little else
that could be done.
It has been customary in contentious proceedings for the Presi-
dent to announce before closing that the Court reserves the right to
request the parties to furnish additional explanations or information.
During its twenty-second session the Permanent Court requested an
agent to submit a document. The hearing was concluded before the
document was submitted. The questions then arose whether the Court
could maintain the request since it could use information only after
it had been communicated to the interested parties and would have
to hold a hearing if a party objected. The President stated the Court
would accept the document without committing himself to the pro-
cedure to be followed.
2 5
The advisory proceedings present no problem as to time limitations
in filing evidence, all material produced being for the information of
the Court and the decision having no binding effect.
(3.) Burden of Proof.
The burden of proof rule applied by the Court is the simple formula
of the Civil Law. The burden of proof rests upon the party which
asserts the affirmative of a proposition which if not substantiated will
result in a decision adverse to his contention. 20 A distinction between
the burden of the risk of non-persuasion and the burden of going
forward with the evidence has not been accepted by the Court.28 7
234. 4 CORru CHANNEL CASE - PLEADINGS, ORAL ARGUMENTS, AND DOCUMENTS
305-16 (I.C.J. 1948).
235. P.C.I.J., Ser. E, No. 8, at 268. The case cannot be identified from the record.
In a few cases agents have attempted to submit documents in an apparent effort to
frustrate a reply by their opponents. See P.I.C.I.J., Ser. E, No. 6, at 297, 298. The
rules make no detailed provisions for the time limits for submissions of evidence in
interventions, revisions and appeals to the Court. RULES INT'L CT. JuST. arts. 64,
65, 67, 78.
236. SANDIFER, EVIDENCE BEFORE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS 92 (1939). Judge
Hudson notes: "on several occasions the Court has referred to the burden of proof
as falling on a particular, but without distinguishing it from the burden of going for-
ward with the proof." HUDSON, THE PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE
(1920-1942) 565 (1943).
237. See 5 WIGMORE, EvIDENCE 434, 440-56.
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The procedures of the Court are flexible and there is no jury. In some
instances it is difficult to determine which State is plaintiff and which
defendant. The Court also may make independent findings of fact.
In the Corfu Channel Case the United Kingdom admitted it bore the
burden of proof of Albanian complicity but argued that the burden
would be discharged by satisfying the Court of Albanian complicity
with reasonable certainty. The British further argued that the burden
of going forward with the evidence was shifted to Albania because
Albania had exclusive control of its territorial waters and adjacent
land and knowledge of the events preceding the mining was likely to
be confined to her government. 238  Albania appeared to admit the
burden of proof on her counter-claim but argued that the British bore
the burden of proof on their defenses of innocent passage, securing
evidence for the Court and self help.2 39 The British answered that,
assuming the Albanian contention was true, once the British established
the principle of their exception, the burden would shift to Albania to
show that the British had exceeded their rights. The Court rejected
the British argument that exclusive control and special knowledge
by Albania shifted the burden of going forward with the evidence on
the issue of complicity.24° The Court ruled in favor of Albania on
that part of its counterclaim pertaining to "Operation Retail" and
thus did not pass upon the issue whether, if the British could have
proved their exception, the burden of going forward with the evidence
on the issue of unreasonable exercise of the British rights would have
shifted.
In the Minquiers and Erechos Case241 the special agreement be-
tween France and the United Kingdom stated their intent as to the
presentation of pleadings without prejudice to any question as to the
burden of proof. The Court, considering the positions of the parties,
both claiming sovereignty over the same territory, and the question
of title that was in issue, decided that each party must prove its own
title and the facts upon which it relied.
The International Court of Justice has had little occasion to dis-
cuss questions of burden of proof.242 The Permanent Court likewise
238. 3 CORFU CHANNEL CASE - PLEADINGS, ORAL ARGUMENTS, AND DOCUMENTS
220, 250 (I.C.J. 1948).
239. 3 id. at 405, 406.
240. Corfu Channel Case, Judgment of April 9, 1949, [1949] I.C.J. Rep. 4, at 18.
241. Judgment of November 17, 1953, [1953] I.C.J. Rep. 47, at 52.
242. See Columbian - Peruvian Asylum Case, Judgment of November 20, 1950,
[1950] I.C.J. Rep. 266, at 276; Nottebohm Case (Second Phase), Judgment of April 6,
1955, [1955] I.C.J. Rep. 4, at 30.
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considered burden of proof in only a few cases.248 There is no indica-
tion from the cases decided that the Court is likely to import the
common law complexities of burden of proof nor does there seem any
justification for doing so.
(4.) Judicial Notice.
The judges of the Court often bring to a case facts that have not,
strictly speaking, been introduced in evidence. In the nature of the
work of the judges of the Court and in view of the kind of case with
which the Court deals, the judge cannot be a stranger to a case in
the sense that a judge of a national court may hear a case for the
first time when it is argued before him. By its statute the Court is
not restricted to the evidence produced by the parties. Informal con-
tributions by the judges are inevitable and desirable. Thus, while
the Court has had occasion to take judicial notice of certain facts,
judicial notice has been used more often to describe the things that
the Court will not consider without proof. For example, the Court
has stated that it will not take notice of a municipal law but will obtain
knowledge of it with the aid of the parties or by inquiries by the
Court.244 On the other hand, the Court will take notice of treaties
and administrative acts relating to them.245 The Court will also take
notice of historical events 240 and publicized contemporary political
situations.247
(5.) Circumstantial Evidence - Adverse Presumptions.
The Court has dealt with circumstantial evidence in a number
of cases. 48 In the Corfu Channel Case the Court based its decision on
the British claim upon circumstantial evidence and thus found it neces-
sary to discuss the matter in detail. The Court rejected the British
argument that exclusive control by Albania over the Corfu Channel
area and exclusive knowledge of the events preceding the mining
243. See Eastern Greenland Case, P.C.I.J., Ser. A/B, No. 53, at 49 (1933);
Mavrommatis Concessions Case, P.C.I.J., Ser. A, No. 5, at 30 (1925).
244. Case Concerning the Payment in Gold of Brazilian Federal Loans Con-
tracted in France, P.C.I.J., Ser. A, No. 21, at 124 (1929); See Danzig Legislative
Decrees, P.C.I.J., Ser. A/B, No. 65, at 61 (1935).
245. Case Relating to the Territorial Jurisdiction of the International Commis-
sion of the River Oder, P.C.I.J., Ser. A, No. 23, at 19 (1929).
246. Anchorage in the Port of Danzig by Polish War Vessels, P.C.I.J., Ser. A/B,
No. 43, at 144 (1931).
247. German interests in Upper Silesia, P.C.I.J., Ser. A, No. 7, at 73 (1926)
See Customs Regime Between Germany and Austria, P.C.I.J., Ser. A/B, No. 41, at 70(1921).
248. E.g., The Oscar Chinn Case, Ser. A/B, No. 63 (1934). Had the Borchgrave
case not been withdrawn the Court would have faced a state protection issue based
upon circumstantial evidence. See P.C.I.J., Ser. A/B, No. 72 (1937).
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would shift the burden of going forward with the evidence on the
issue of complicity to Albania. The Court stated, however, that Al-
bania's position precluded the British from furnishing direct proof of
facts giving rise to responsibility so that the British should be allowed
a more liberal recourse to inferences of fact and circumstantial evidence.
"This indirect evidence is admitted in all systems of law, and its use
is recognized by international decisions. It must be regarded as of
special weight when it is based on a series of facts linked together
and leading logically to a single conclusion."24 The Court considered
proof of Albanian knowledge of the mining could be drawn from in-
ferences of fact provided they leave no room for reasonable doubt.
From the attitude of Albania before and after the mining incident
in conjunction with the information furnished by its experts, the Court
concluded that Albania must have had knowledge of the mining.25°
The World Court appears unwilling to draw inferences from the
non-production of documents, although the statute indicates that the
Court may take formal notice of a refusal to produce.2 ' In the Corfu
Channel Case the Court was urged to infer from the refusal of the
British to produce Order X.C.U., which related to the passage of the
Corfu Strait on 22 October 1946, that the order contained instruc-
tions to reconnoiter the Albanian Coast. The Court refused to
draw conclusions differing from those to which the actual events gave
rise.52 The use of adverse presumptions might provide an effective
sanction for the production of documents. 5 3
D. Security Considerations.
A disclosure of facts is a major object of judicial proceedings.
A State which commences a case before the Court must assume that
assertion of its claim will entail a disclosure of information which it
might prefer to restrict. The assertion of State policy in judicial pro-
ceedings is accompanied by a security loss. Likewise, a State which
accepts the jurisdiction of the Court must anticipate a security loss in
making its defense or asserting a counterclaim. In the Corfu Channel
249. Judgment of April 9, 1949, [19491 I.C.J. Rep. 4, at 18.
250. For a different view concerning the required weight of circumstantial evi-
dence see the dissenting opinion of Judge Badawi. Id. at .59, 60.
251. STAT. INT'L CT. JUST. art. 49.
252. Judgment of April 9, 1949, [1949] I.C.J. Rep. 4, at 32.
253. There is also a possibility that the Court may draw favorable inferences
from documents not produced. In this connection consider- the efforts of Sir Frank
Soskice to dispel from the minds of the judges an inference by M. Cot concerning
what he could have done with some documents if they could have been used in evidence.
3 CORFU CHANNEL CASE - PLEADINGS, ORAL ARGUMENTS, AND DOCUMENTS 561
(I.C.J. 1948).
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Case the Albanian agent produced a secret report by General Hodgson,
who was at one time chief of the British Military Mission in Albania,
the report apparently having been obtained by espionage. The report
was submitted to the Court as a photograph of an edited document.
In order to prove that the document had been edited, the British found
it necessary to introduce a photograph of the un-edited document which
at the time was still classified as secret.254. In the Albanian counterclaim
it was contended that the British vessels were not in innocent passage
at the time of the mine incident on October 22, 1946. In support of
this claim they relied upon a report of the Captain of the "Volage,"
one of the damaged vessels, in which it was stated that the Albanian
defenses had been studied at close range and that the information was
included with reference to X.C.U. The Court requested the British
agent to produce this document but he refused to do so on the ground
of naval secrecy even though the Albanian agent offered to produce
all relevant Albanian orders and instructions "even the most secret"
in exchange for the production of Order X.C.U.255
The pressure to disclose information may be exerted against a
State not technically a party to the proceeding. In the Corfu Channel
Case the British introduced the testimony of Commander Kovacic, a
former Yugoslav navy officer, who had been in charge of signal re-
pairs at the Yugoslav naval shipyard at Sibenik before the mining
incident of 22 October 1946. Commander Kovacic's testimony indi-
cated that the Yugoslav minelayers, Mljet and Meljine, had been
loaded with G.Y. mines at the base shortly before 22 October 1946
and had put to sea, returning a short time later unladen. He offered
hearsay evidence that the mines had been laid in the Corfu Channel. 256
The testimony supported the British contention that the mines had been
laid with Albanian connivance. In an effort to counteract this testi-
mony the Albanians secured from the Yugoslavs certain documents,
among which was the register of the shipyard at Sibenik. Originally
a photostat of one page had been submitted, but the British objected
254. 2 CORFU CHANNEL CASE - PLEADINGS, ORAL ARGUMENTS, AND DOCUMENTS
255; 3 id. at 204.
255. Corfu Channel Case, Judgment of April 9, 1949, [19491 I.C.J. Rep. 4, at 31,
32; 3 CORFU. CHANNEL CASE - PLEADINGS, ORAL ARGUMENTS, AND DOcUMENTS 291(I.C.J. 1948) ; 3 id. at 185, 291; 4 id. at 270, 598; 5 id. at 255. The British also
refused to produce the operational orders governing "Operation Retail" although
Admiralty orders governing this operation were submitted, in some cases being para-
phrased to secure the Naval cipher. The Albanians produced none of their official
documents, if such existed, relating to investigations of the mining incident or their
response to "Operation Retail."
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to this and the entire register, although secret, was deposited with the
('ourt.257 The British then requested permission to examine the register.
The conditions set by the Yugoslavs and Albanians and agreed to by
the British and the Court were that the British representatives were
to look at the pages of the register other than the page in question
only in the presence of a representative of the Yugoslav Government
and, in looking at the other pages, the British could not examine them
in detail but could leaf through them rapidly to determine if they
were in the right order and to see, superficially, whether pages had
been cut out or inserted.2"' The Yugoslav Government also received
the expert commission sent by the Court to investigate certain facilities
at Sibenik. The only major restriction imposed upon the mission
was the Yugoslav refusal to allow them to inspect the repair shops
at Mandalina on grounds of naval secrecy.259
To a limited degree the Court can control the disclosure to the
public of classified information which it collects in the course of its
proceedings. The Court can close its hearings to the public.2 6 It may
exclude its own officers from hearings and exclude witnesses from
the proceedings when not testifying.261 The proceedings need not be
reported to the press.2 62 The Court swears its experts and commis-
sioners of investigation to secrecy.26 The deliberations of the Court
are private and remain secret.264 But many leaks are possible. The
parties are entitled to be represented by agents and counsel. 265 A cer-
tified copy of every document produced by one party must be com-
municated to the other party. 26 A State may intervene in the pro-
ceeding. 26" The Court must state the ground for its decision in its
opinion.26 s
The "built-in leaks" to which the Court is subject creates two
difficulties: (1) The responsibility of the Court in handling secret
information which it obtains and (2) the resistance of States to jur-
isdiction because of the possibility of security losses.
257. 4 id. at 313.
258. 4 id. at 357, 366; 5 id. at 238.
259. 5 id. at 264.
260. STAT. INT'L CT. JusT. art. 46.
261. Id. art. 45.
262. The Registrar is the liaison officer with the press. Representatives of the
press are excluded in closed hearings.
263. An oath was administered in the Chorzow and in the Corfu cases.
264. STAT. INT'L CT. JUST. art. 54, 3.
265. Id. art. 42, f111 , 2.
266. Id. art. 43, fT 4.
267. Id. art. 62.
268. Id. art. 56.
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The Court has attempted to solve the question of responsibility
in handling secret information by denying responsibility in part. In
1926, President Huber proposed a new rule of Court placing the
responsibility on the party which introduced the secret information
and allowing the opposing party to demand a private hearing.26 9 The
proposal met with much opposition from the Court on the ground that
it was superfluous and perhaps dangerous since the parties acting
together might produce any information they saw fit. The consensus
of the Court appeared to be that the State producing the information
was responsible in principle and that the Court could exclude evidence
which it could not properly take into account and make public.
2 70
Resistance to the jurisdiction of the Court or obstruction of its
fact gathering processes on security grounds is a more serious matter.
The principal difficulty encountered by the Permanent Court was in
obtaining preparatory materials used for the Versailles Conference.271
In his dissenting opinion in the Oscar Chinn Case, Judge Van Eysinga
noted:
"The undersigned cannot refrain in this connection from
expressing his regret that the Court should frequently be called
upon to give decisions in regard to collective conventions con-
cluded after the Great War without having at its disposal the rec-
ords of the meetings at which these conventions were elaborated,
these records being kept secret. The resulting lack of information
has more than once made itself felt in the present case.
272
The security restrictions proved an embarrassment even in those
cases in which one of the parties offered to produce the necessary
materials. In The Jurisdiction of the European Commission of the
Danube271 the agent of one of the States cited certain records of the
preparation of the Versailles treaty. Counsel for another State ob-
jected to the use of the records in evidence because they were secret.
One of the States interested in the proceeding offered to supply the
records in question. The Registrar was directed to obtain from the
French Minister of Foreign Affairs a verification of the citations and
269. P.C.I.J., Ser. D, No. 2 (add.) at 124-25, 251.
270. See SANDIFER, EVIDENCE BEVORE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS 89-91 (1939).
271. See The S.S. "Wimbledon," P.C.I.J., Ser. A, No. 1 (1923) ; P.C.I.J., Ser. E,
No. 4, at 288; Advisory Opinions 2 and 3 on Competence of International Labor
Organization, P.C.I.J., Ser. B, No. 23 (1922) ; P.C.I.J., Ser. E, No. 4, at 288. For
other difficulties of the Permanent Court with security issues see the Diversion of
Water From the Meuse, P.C.I.J., Ser. A/B, No. 70 (1937) ; The Monastery of St.
Naoum, P.C.I.J., Ser. B, No. 9 (1924) ; P.C.I.J., Ser. E, No. 6, at 296.
272. The Oscar Chinn Case, P.C.I.J., Ser. A/B, No. 63, at 136 (1934).
273. P.C.I.J., Ser. B, No. 14 (1927) ; P.C.I.J., Ser. E, No. 4, at 288.
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obtain his views on the offer made by the interested government. The
Court reversed its decision on the matter of admitting the records in
evidence pending an answer to its inquiry but delivered its opinion
before the answer was received. Subsequently the President of the
Conference of Ambassadors expressed his appreciation of the Court's
refusal to take the secret documents into consideration without the
unanimous consent of all States concerned.
While the Permanent Court did not renounce its authority to re-
quest the production of documents, secret or not, in some cases secret
documents were excluded upon grounds that avoided the secrecy
issue.274 In the case of International Commission of the Oder275 the
Polish agent referred to preparatory work done by the Commission
on Ports, Waterways and Railways of the Versailles Conference. The
evidence was excluded on the ground that the Polish agent did not
intend to make use of these records in his defense and the records
could not be used in any event since three of the parties in the case,
Germany, Denmark and Sweden, had not participated in the prepara-
tory work and the materials could not be used to determine for them
the meaning of the treaty.
Since the Corfu Channel Case, few advisory opinions or conten-
tious proceedings presented to the Court have involved serious security
issues." 6 In those cases in which security issues might have been
involved, the defendant State has not accepted the jurisdiction of the
Court.277 Security considerations will probably be the catalysts de-
termining which cases are received by the Court and which are not.
The British decision to refuse the jurisdiction of the Court in matters
involving the national security of the United Kingdom, while perhaps
precipitated by the threat of judicial action concerning the tests of
hydrogen bombs, is prophetic of the future.2
274. See Diversion of Waters from the Meuse, P.C.I.J., Ser. A/B, No. 70 (1937)
P.C.I.J., Ser. E, No. 4, at 288.
275. P.C.I.J., Ser. A, No. 23, at 41 (1929).
276. See Interpretation of Peace Treaties, Advisory Opinion of March 30, 1950,
[1950] I.C.J. Rep. 65, at 95 in which Judge Winiarski makes the point the Court has
insufficient facts to decide the case, Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary not participating
in the proceeding.
277. See Case of Treatment in Hungary of Aircraft of United States of America,
Order of July 12, 1954, [1954] I.C.J. Rep. 99; Aerial Incident of March 10, 1953,
Order of March 14, 1956, [1956] I.C.J. Rep. 6; Aerial Incident of October 7, 1952,
Order of March 14, 1956, [1956] I.C.J. Rep. 9.
278. Richmond Times Dispatch, Aug. 22, 1957, p. 1, col. 1.
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CONCLUSION.
As an occasional court, one to which the cases of secondary im-
portance will be referred for settlement, the World Court has fact-
finding facilities as good as it needs. It is true that the facts in its
decisions show alarming gaps. In the Peter Pazmany University
Case279 the Court did not have most of the documents of the written
proceedings of the arbitral tribunal which made the decision being re-
viewed. In the Lotus Case280 the Court did not have the Turkish ju-
dicial decision that gave rise to the dispute. In the case of Minority
Schools in Albania28 the decision was rendered based upon many
assumptions concerning the Albanian education situation. But if the
Court can be developed into a more vital force as part of the United
Nations structure, which is a major assumption, attention to its fact-
finding resources should receive a high priority. In particular, it may
be hoped that the advisory jurisdiction of the Court can be expanded,
since the advisory proceeding is the ideal fact-finding vehicle under
the present statute of the Court.
279. P.C.I.J., Ser. A/B, No. 61, at 217, 240 (1933).
280. P.C.I.J., Ser. A, No. 10, at 11 (1927); P.C.I.J., Ser. E, No. 4, at 289.
281. P.C.I.J., Ser. A/B, No. 64, at 11, 12, 14, 16 (1935).
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